On March 25, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its much anticipated decision in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., which centered on whether UPS unlawfully discriminated against a pregnant employee by denying her a light-duty accommodation for her lifting restriction.  The Court vacated a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, which granted summary judgment in favor of UPS. Peggy Young, the plaintiff, was a part-time driver for UPS.  UPS policy required drivers to be able to lift up to 70 pounds.  When Young became pregnant, her doctors advised her that she should not lift more than 20 pounds during the first 20 weeks of her pregnancy.  Based on its internal policy, UPS advised Young that she could not work under the lifting restriction. Young sued UPS, claiming that it had discriminated against her by refusing to accommodate her pregnancy-related lifting restriction.  Young alleged that UPS had provided other drivers who had similar restrictions with light-duty accommodations, but UPS argued that it only provided light-duty work to a limited number of employees, including those who:  (1) were injured on the job; (2) had lost their Department of Transportation certification; or (3) had an ADA-covered disability. Young argued that under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"), which amended the definitions subsection of Title VII to include pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination, if an employer accommodates only a subset of workers with disabling conditions, pregnant workers who are similar in their ability or inability to work must be treated the same regardless of whether there are other non-pregnant employees who do not receive the same accommodations.  Unpersuaded by this broad approach, the Court stated that it doubted Congress “intended to grant pregnant workers an unconditional most-favored-nation status.” However, the Court also refused to accept UPS’ interpretation of the PDA.  UPS argued that the second provision of the PDA (which requires employers to treat "women affected by pregnancy . . . the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work") means that an employer is not required to accommodate a pregnant employee if there are other non-pregnant employees who also are not eligible for such accommodations.  UPS argued that pregnant employees such as Young were treated exactly the same as non-pregnant employees who had temporary lifting restrictions due to off-the-job injuries, and that its refusal to provide an accommodation for Young was therefore lawful. The Court also refused to “rely significantly” on the EEOC guidance which was issued in July of 2014 -- less than two weeks after the Supreme Court decided to hear the case.  The EEOC guidance provided that "an employer may not refuse to treat a pregnant worker the same as other employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work by relying on a policy that makes distinctions based on the source of an employee's limitations (e.g., a policy of providing light duty only to workers injured on the job)."  The Court reasoned that the EEOC’s position was inconsistent with previous positions and the EEOC failed to explain the basis of its guidance. Instead, the Court announced its own interpretation.  It held that a pregnant employee attempting to establish a claim of disparate treatment based on pregnancy may do so through the same general framework applicable to other types of employment discrimination claims (known as the McDonnell Douglas framework).  An employee who alleges that an employer’s denial of a pregnancy accommodation constitutes disparate treatment under the PDA must establish a prima facie case that:  (1) she belongs to the protected class; (2) she sought an accommodation; (3) the employer did not accommodate her; and (4) the employer did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to work.” Once the employee establishes her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to justify its refusal to accommodate the employee.  The Court advised, however, that the employer cannot merely claim that accommodating pregnant women is “more expensive or less convenient.” If the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the employee must show the employer’s reason is a pretext for pregnancy discrimination.  The Court held that the employee may satisfy her burden at this stage by providing “sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather -- when considered along with the burden imposed -- give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”  For the claim to survive summary judgment, the employee can provide evidence that although the employer accommodates a large percentage of non-pregnant workers, it does not accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers. Applying this standard, the Court explained that Young may be able to show that UPS provides light-duty accommodations to most non-pregnant employees with lifting restrictions, while “categorically failing” to accommodate pregnant employees with similar lifting restrictions.  Accordingly, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s grant of summary judgment in favor of UPS, as there was a genuine dispute as to whether UPS treated employees whose situation “cannot reasonably be distinguished from Young’s” more favorably. For employers, this case may create more confusion than clarification on the issue of what obligation it may have to provide light duty assignments to pregnant employees.  However, given the Court’s articulation of the applicable legal standard, employers should:

• review their light duty policies and determine whether such policies should also apply to pregnant employees;
• review all other workplace accommodation policies to ensure compliance with the PDA and Americans with Disabilities Act;
• establish a policy for addressing requests for an accommodation, and in particular, requests from pregnant employees; and
• train supervisors and managers with regard to pregnant employees’ requests for an accommodation.

Employers are likely well aware of the conditions that must be satisfied before an employee can be deemed eligible for leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”):

• the employee has worked for the employer for at least 12 months;
• the employee has worked 1,250 hours in the 12 months preceding the leave request; and
• the employer has 50 or more employees at, or within 75 miles of, the employee’s workplace -- the so-called “50/75” requirement

If one of these conditions is not satisfied, an employer cannot later be held liable for any FMLA-related claims brought by an employee, right?  Not so fast!  Although determining whether these conditions are met is typically the simplest step in the FMLA certification process, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently reminded employers of the headaches they may face if they are not careful in notifying their employees of these conditions. On January 26, 2015, the Sixth Circuit decided Tilley v. Kalamazoo County Road Commission.  Tilley was employed by the Road Commission, which did not meet the 50/75 requirement.  The Road Commission’s personnel manual contained the following statement regarding an employee’s eligibility to apply for FMLA benefits:  "Employees covered under the Family and Medical Leave Act are full-time employees who have worked for the Road Commission and accumulated 1,250 work hours in the previous 12 months." On August 1, 2011, Tilley began experiencing symptoms that made him fear that he was suffering a heart attack.  He was taken to the hospital, admitted for observation, and discharged the next day.  After his discharge, Tilley’s wife informed the Road Commission that Tilley would not be able to return to work until at least August 5. On August 9, a Road Commission representative sent Tilley FMLA paperwork that informed him that he was “eligible for FMLA leave.”  At no time was Tilley informed that the Road Commission did not meet the 50/75 requirement, or that such a requirement even existed.  On August 12, the Road Commission terminated Tilley’s employment, claiming that the reason for his termination was his failure to timely submit certain work assignments. Tilley filed suit, claiming that the Road Commission interfered with his right to FMLA leave and retaliated against him for taking such leave.  The Sixth Circuit agreed with the Road Commission that Tilley was not technically an “eligible employee” under FMLA, but concluded that Tilley’s case could continue because there was a dispute as to whether the Road Commission was “equitably estopped” from denying that Tilley was an eligible employee. The Court explained that “in certain circumstances equitable estoppel applies to employer statements regarding an employee’s FMLA eligibility, preventing the employer from raising non-eligibility as a defense.”  In order to prevail on such an “equitable estoppel” argument, an employee must show a definite misrepresentation by the employer, a reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation, and a resulting detriment to the employee who reasonably relied on the misrepresentation.  The Court found that Tilley presented sufficient evidence on all three elements to allow his case to continue. As to the first element, the Court held that the Road Commission’s personnel manual contained a “clear misrepresentation” as to Tilley’s eligibility to apply for FMLA benefits.  Specifically, the manual contained an “unambiguous and unqualified statement” that Tilley was covered by FMLA and was eligible to apply for FMLA benefits if he worked 1,250 hours in the previous 12 months, but it failed to note that the 50/75 requirement must also be satisfied.  Next, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence that Tilley relied upon the eligibility statement in the manual, which was sufficient to satisfy the second element.  Finally, as to the third element, the Court held that Tilley suffered a detriment as a result of his reliance on the eligibility statement in the manual since he was fired in part because he missed a deadline that he claims he would not have missed but for his reliance on the manual.  Therefore, because Tilley raised questions of fact regarding all elements of an equitable estoppel claim, the Court permitted Tilley’s FMLA claims to move forward. The takeaway from this decision is straightforward:  employers should immediately review their personnel manuals and/or FMLA policies to ensure that they are well-drafted and that all eligibility conditions for FMLA leave are adequately explained.  A poorly drafted or incomplete FMLA policy could result in an employer being in a situation similar to the Road Commission -- potentially being liable for an FMLA claim even when the employee making the claim is not even technically eligible for FMLA leave!

The General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) recently published a guidance memorandum that provides specific examples of lawful and unlawful employee handbook rules in the areas of confidentiality, professionalism and employee conduct, use of company logos, copyrights and trademarks, conflicts of interest, photography and recording, and interaction with the media and other third parties.  The memorandum also includes General Counsel-approved handbook rules that were adopted as part of an unfair labor practice settlement with the fast-food chain, Wendy’s. Over the past few years, the NLRB and its General Counsel have aggressively scrutinized many frequently used employee handbook provisions.  The basis for this scrutiny is the alleged infringement of the right of employees to engage in protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).  Section 7 activity includes the right to discuss, challenge, question, and advocate changes in wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment in both unionized and non-unionized work environments.  Of course, it also includes the right to engage in union organizing.  A majority of the current NLRB will deem an employee handbook provision to violate the NLRA if it specifically prohibits Section 7 activity or if “employees would reasonably construe” the rule as prohibiting such activity.  It is this “reasonably construe” language that has resulted in many common employee handbook provisions being declared unlawful by the majority of the current NLRB. While one could editorialize at length regarding the razor-thin distinctions drawn between the provisions found lawful and unlawful, the usefulness of the guidance for employers lies in its concrete examples, some of which are highlighted below. Confidentiality Rules A confidentiality policy will be deemed by the current NLRB to violate the NLRA if it specifically prohibits employee discussions regarding terms and conditions of employment, such as wages or workplace conditions, or if employees would reasonably construe the policy to prohibit such discussions. Unlawful

• Do not discuss customer or employee information outside of work, including phone numbers and addresses.
• Never publish or disclose the employer’s or another’s confidential or other proprietary information.  Never publish or report on conversations that are meant to be private or internal to the employer.

Lawful

• No unauthorized disclosure of business secrets or other confidential information.
• Do not disclose confidential financial data, or other non-public proprietary company information.  Do not share confidential information regarding business partners, vendors, or customers.

Employee Conduct/Professionalism Rules The memorandum reinforces that employees have the right to criticize their employer’s policies and actions toward its employees, and therefore, any policies prohibiting disrespectful, inappropriate, or rude conduct toward the employer have been deemed unlawfully overbroad.  In contrast, rules requiring employees to be respectful to co-workers, clients, and customers have generally been found to be lawful. Unlawful

• Be respectful of the company, other employees, customers, partners, and competitors.
• No defamatory, libelous, slanderous, or discriminatory comments about the company, its customers and/or competitors, its employees, or management.

Lawful

• No rudeness or unprofessional behavior toward a customer or anyone in contact with the company.
• Being insubordinate, threatening, intimidating, disrespectful, or assaulting a manager/supervisor, co-worker, customer, or vendor will result in discipline.

Use of Company Logos, Copyrights, and Trademarks The NLRB has found that a broad ban on use of an employer’s name, logo, or other trademark is unlawful because it may restrict the use of the company name and logo on picket signs, leaflets, and other protest material. Unlawful

• Do not use any company logos, trademarks, graphics, or advertising materials in social media.

Lawful

• Respect all copyright and other intellectual property laws.  For the employer’s protection as well as your own, it is critical that you show proper respect for the laws governing copyright, fair use of copyrighted material owned by others, trademarks, and other intellectual property, including the employer’s own copyrights, trademarks, and brands.

The release of this guidance suggests the NLRB will continue to aggressively enforce and scrutinize the employment policies of union and non-union employers.  An unlawful policy is itself a violation of the NLRA, and if an employee is disciplined or terminated for violating an unlawful policy, the discipline could be rescinded and the employer could be ordered to restore the employee to his/her position with back pay. As seen in the examples above, tweaking one or two words or adding additional context and clarification to what would be an otherwise overbroad policy can mean the difference between an unlawful or lawful policy.  Employers should, therefore, use this memorandum as a guide in reviewing and revising their handbooks and other employee rules.

In prior blog articles, we’ve visited the battle field with Sun Tzu to learn the art of defending employment litigation, Santa’s Workshop for a holiday reminder that we can be sued for just about anything, and the major league baseball diamond with A-Rod for a lesson in swinging for the fences with the faithless servant doctrine.  Our next stop on the Employment Law Express is to confer with one of the foremost Zen-masters on a more peaceful approach to our day-to-day employment matters.  That master is none other than the venerable Winnie the Pooh. Often thought of only as a cuddly focal point in children’s fiction, Pooh Corner offers a host of spiritual wisdom that has broad applications as to how we can best manage our day-to-day strife in the world of human resources.  So let’s take a careful look at some of the more astute Pooh-isms and what they tell us about how best to minimize the agita in our work. "It's more fun to talk with someone who doesn't use long difficult words but rather short easy words like, 'What about lunch?'" Indeed, though apparently Winnie the Pooh has never had lunch with a lawyer.  Not using (I thought about using the word “Eschewing”) long difficult words is not only wise but an absolute necessity in the world of employment law.  Take, for example, company handbooks and policies.  Their whole purpose is to provide clear notice to employees of the rules governing their employment.  The use of “long difficult words” defeats this purpose.  Ambiguity and uncertainty breed escape hatches for employees which, in turn, disrupt the tranquility of human resources operations. The use of “long difficult words” also becomes a serious problem when trying to enforce a non-compete agreement.  Some courts will hold that ambiguous non-compete clauses are either not enforceable at all or require a full-blown trial to enforce them.  Consequently, it is “more fun” to enforce a non-compete clause that is worded using short easy words that make the employee’s obligations crystal clear.  This holds true with any type of employment, separation or severance agreement -- they should contain short, easy language that even a bear who forgets to wear pants can understand. "People say nothing is impossible, but I do nothing every day!" While most of our employees are dedicated and hard-working, there are always a few exceptions who put a great deal of effort into doing nothing.  Think George Costanza.  The problems with these type of employees are many and include lost productivity and loss of morale among other employees who do not have the luxury of doing nothing all day.  So we need to make doing nothing all day impossible.  The caveat here is that nothing-doers tend to sue for discrimination when their reign of nothingness is put to an end.  To avoid such claims, or make them easily dismissible, ironically requires hard work on our part.  This means well-written (short easy words) counseling and disciplinary memos documenting the lack of performance and failure to follow specific directives. This played out in the interesting case of Sanzo v. Uniondale Union Free School District.  The plaintiff school custodian sued his former employer claiming that he was unlawfully terminated on the basis of his disability, narcolepsy, which caused him to occasionally fall asleep on the job.  The well-documented personnel file, however, demonstrated that discrimination was not at all at play.  The plaintiff was not fired because he fell asleep, but rather he was fired because he declined to do his job when he was awake. In the end, what Pooh is telling us is that some people will find it possible to do nothing at least until such time as someone with supervisory authority affirmatively makes it impossible. "You can't stay in your corner of the forest, waiting for others to come to you; you have to go to them sometimes." There are certainly days when sanity dictates that we stay in our own corner of the proverbial forest.  Staying too long, however, is like saying “open sesame” to the door of liability.  This often comes up in the context of workplace harassment and bullying investigations.  We’ve all gotten much better at the initial response to complaints and we conduct our investigations promptly and fairly.  The problem arises, however, when the harassment, if established, is not sufficiently severe to warrant terminating the alleged harasser so some other resolution is formulated (e.g., the harasser is separated from the complainant).  With such a remedial measure, our job is done, right?  Actually, the seeming completion of a workplace investigation is precisely not the time to retreat to our corner of the forest.  Rather, that is the time to periodically go out to see the complainant to make sure that no further harassment is taking place.  Our anti-harassment policies become viable defenses when they are not just initially followed but continually followed to stop any ongoing harassment.  Getting out of our corner of the forest means being proactive and being proactive defeats lawsuits. Although we all continue to get older and more experienced, the answers to many of our day-to-day problems nonetheless can still often be found in the pages of books long left unopened on our children’s bookshelves (or Kindles, I-Pads, etc.). Note:  All of the Pooh-isms in this blog article can be found in A.A. Milne's Winnie the Pooh and Pooh's Little Instruction Book.

On March 9, 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled unanimously in two consolidated cases that a federal agency does not have to go through the formal rulemaking process, which includes providing public notice and an opportunity for comment, “when it wishes to issue a new interpretation of a regulation that deviates significantly from one the agency has previously adopted.” The underlying issue in the two cases -- Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association and Nickols et al. v. Mortgage Bankers Association -- began when the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) changed its opinion regarding whether mortgage-loan officers are covered by the so-called “administrative exemption” of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  Prior to 2004, DOL's Wage and Hour Division issued written advisory opinions that mortgage-loan officers are not eligible for the administrative exemption, and are entitled to payment of overtime for hours worked over 40 in a work week.  In 2004, DOL revised its white collar exemption regulations, but there was some ambiguity regarding whether mortgage-loan officers fell within the revised administrative exemption.  In 2006, DOL's Wage and Hour Division issued a written advisory opinion that mortgage-loan officers qualify for the administrative exemption as revised in 2004.  However, in 2010, DOL's Wage and Hour Division changed its mind and issued a written advisory opinion that mortgage-loan officers do not qualify for the administrative exemption. The Mortgage Bankers Association challenged this 2010 administrative interpretation in federal court, alleging, among other things, that DOL’s interpretation was procedurally invalid in light of a previous decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (Paralyzed Veterans v. D.C. Arena L.P.).  Under the so-called “Paralyzed Veterans doctrine,” an agency may not significantly revise its interpretation of a regulation without providing public notice and an opportunity for comment pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").  The D.C. Circuit re-affirmed the doctrine in the Mortgage Bankers Association cases, holding that the 2010 administrative interpretation had to be vacated because DOL did not hold a notice-and-comment period. The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's decision.  In an opinion penned by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court held that the “Paralyzed Veterans doctrine" is contrary to the clear text of the APA’s rulemaking provisions, and it improperly imposes on agencies an obligation beyond the ‘maximum procedural requirements’ specified in the APA.”  Justice Sotomayor stated that although the D.C. Circuit was correct that the APA requires agencies to follow the notice-and-comment requirements when amending or repealing a substantive rule -- in the same manner as issuing a substantive rule in the first instance -- the D.C. Circuit “went wrong” when it applied the same reasoning to interpretations of rules.  In sum, “[b]ecause an agency is not required to use notice-and-comment procedures to issue an initial interpretive rule, it is also not required to use those procedures when it amends or repeals that interpretive rule,” unless “notice or hearing is required by statute.” The implications of the Supreme Court's decision reach far beyond the FLSA status of mortgage-loan officers.  The Supreme Court’s ruling paves the way for federal agencies to make significant changes to its interpretations of rules without notice to the public and an opportunity for public comment.  Although employers can still look to administrative interpretations (such as opinion letters issued by DOL's Wage and Hour Division) for some guidance in complying with employment laws and regulations, employers should be diligent about keeping up with any changes to those administrative interpretations.

Jennifer Brand, Associate Solicitor of Labor, spoke at the American Bar Association Federal Labor Standards Legislation Committee’s Mid-Winter Meeting on February 26.  Ms. Brand provided an update on important USDOL initiatives and activities.  Ms. Brand discussed recent litigation involving interns and confirmed that the USDOL still believes the six factors outlined in its Fact Sheet #71 is the proper test to determine whether an unpaid internship is lawful.  Ms. Brand did acknowledge that as the workplace evolves, it may, in unusual situations, be appropriate to consider other factors. Ms. Brand also discussed the USDOL's appeal of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia’s order vacating two major provisions in the USDOL’s Home Care Rule originally intended to be effective January 1, 2015.  The new rule would have excluded third-party employers from relying on the companionship and live-in domestic worker exemptions and would have significantly narrowed the definition of companionship services.  It is anticipated the case will be heard in the May term. Finally, Ms. Brand acknowledged that the highly anticipated proposed changes to the white-collar exemptions would not be published this month as the USDOL had previously suggested.  She further stated that they are “not imminent.”  Although she would not comment on specifics, she stated that the USDOL is examining the appropriate salary level test and whether the duties test needs to be revised.  Practitioners believe that the proposals will include, among other things, raising the salary level test and narrowing the duties test of the exemptions to make it more difficult to classify employees as exempt.  Some of the expected changes may include implementing a strict percentage of exempt and non-exempt duties and the possible elimination of the “concurrent” duties test whereby an employee may perform exempt and non-exempt duties at the same time.

New York State's Acting Commissioner of Labor, Mario Musolino, issued an Order today, accepting most of the recommendations made by the Hospitality Industry Wage Board, including the recommendation to increase the minimum wage for all tipped employees in the Hospitality Industry to $7.50 per hour effective December 31, 2015.  The one recommendation that the Acting Commissioner rejected was the one that would have provided certain employers with some relief from this significant increase in labor costs -- namely, the recommendation to allow employers to take $1.00 off the hourly minimum wage for tipped employees if the weekly average earnings of their employees (wages paid plus tips received) equals or exceeds 150% of the regular minimum wage in New York City or 120% of the regular minimum wage in the rest of the state. So, to summarize, the Acting Commissioner's Order will:  (1) increase the minimum wage for all tipped employees in the Hospitality Industry (regardless of whether they are classified as food service workers, service employees, or resort hotel service employees) to $7.50 per hour effective December 31, 2015; and (2) implement a $1.00 increase in the minimum wage for tipped employees in the Hospitality Industry who work in New York City, which would take effect if and when the legislature enacts a higher minimum wage rate for New York City.  The Acting Commissioner also accepted the Wage Board's recommendation to review whether the current system of cash wages and tip credits should be eliminated. The Acting Commissioner's Order will be effective 30 days after notice of its filing is published in at least 10 newspapers of general circulation in the state.  Employers in the hospitality industry should begin to consider how this significant increase in labor costs attributable to the employment of food service workers and service employees will impact their businesses in 2016 and beyond.

The U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") today announced a change to the definition of spouse under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA").  Under this new rule, which will be published later this week (on February 25, 2015), an employee in a legal same-sex marriage will be entitled to use FMLA leave to care for a same-sex spouse regardless of where the employee lives.  The DOL initially proposed the rule on June 20, 2014. This change was triggered by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in U.S. v. Windsor.  In Windsor, the Court ruled that the federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") was unconstitutional.  Prior to Windsor, and consistent with DOMA, the FMLA defined spouse as a marriage between a man and a woman.  This meant that same-sex married couples could not use FMLA leave to care for each other.  Immediately following Windsor, the DOL announced that an employee could take FMLA leave to care for a same-sex spouse, but only if the employee resided in a state that recognized same-sex marriage (i.e., a “state of residence” approach).  This interpretation meant that a category of same-sex spouses were still unable to use the protections of the FMLA:  those who married in a state recognizing same-sex marriage, but who lived in a state that did not. This latest rule change, which takes effect on March 27, 2015, shifts to a “place of celebration" approach and ensures that same-sex spouses have the same rights as all spouses to exercise FMLA rights.  In other words, as long as the employee is legally married, and regardless of the legal status of same-sex marriage in the state the employee now resides, the employee can take FMLA leave:

• to care for a same-sex spouse with a serious health condition;
• to care for a stepchild who is the child of a same-sex spouse;
• to care for a stepparent who is the same-sex spouse of the employee’s parent;
• due to a qualifying exigency related to the same-sex spouse’s covered military service; or
• to care for a covered servicemember who is a same-sex spouse.

Ahhh, Valentine’s Day, when love is all around.  But if one of Cupid’s arrows lands in your workplace, that warm and fuzzy feeling can quickly turn into headache and indigestion. In your approach to managing office romance, consider the following:

• A total ban on workplace romance may be a total disaster.  A blanket prohibition against co-workers dating each other may be legal, but it brings with it serious practical problems.  Love being what it is, an employer policy against romantic attraction has little chance of actually preventing it.  Add to this the morale problem of what may be viewed as a heavy-handed policy, and a total ban against dating may be more cure than needed.
• Consider a more tailored tact.  Another approach is to have a policy articulating a ban on some, but not all, romantic relationships.  For instance, a policy might prohibit employees in a direct reporting relationship from being romantically involved.  If appropriate for your company’s culture, the policy could provide that no person at a certain management level and above (perhaps a Director level) may be involved romantically with any other employee, regardless of reporting lines.   In some workplaces, a ban on relationships between employees in certain functions, such as those designed to be financial checks and balances on each other, may be appropriate.  Yet another approach is a policy that does not prohibit relationships in any specific context but states that the company may find a romantic relationship incompatible with its legitimate business interests, depending on the circumstances.  In any policy, leave open the possibility that the company may disapprove of romantic relationships in contexts beyond any specifically discussed, including where the company deems there to be a conflict of interest or a risk of financial fraud or collusion.
• Consider requiring disclosure of relationships.  It is generally a good idea to require that romantic relationships, or at least those where one person holds a supervisory role, be disclosed to higher management.  Often, it is not the existence of the relationship that creates the problem but the fact that higher management is not aware of the relationship until something -- a conflict of interest or a harassment allegation -- hits the proverbial fan.  A disclosure requirement is designed to avoid this.  An additional advantage of a disclosure requirement is that it provides another basis for adverse action against a non?disclosing manager:  the reason for discipline or even termination is not necessarily the fact of the relationship but the failure to be honest about it.
• Confirming that the relationship is consensual is often a good idea.  If, as a human resource professional, you become aware that employees are romantically involved, you should consider whether it is appropriate to confirm that the relationship is welcome.  If the relationship is between peers, this may be an unnecessary intrusion into private lives.  However, when the relationship involves employees of unequal power within the organization, it is critical.  This conversation need not be detailed or probing but only enough to ensure that the subordinate employee is comfortable with the situation and to inform him/her that, if that should ever change, he/she has a right to have the romantic attention stop immediately and to report it to human resources if it does not.  Find an appropriate way to document the conversation (which may be as simple as a confirming email or as formal as a letter signed by the employee, depending on the circumstance).
• Do not be shy about confronting inappropriate behavior.  An employer has an interest in ensuring that a relationship does not become a distraction or offensive to others.  If your company love birds are indiscreet, the company can and should require them to keep their behavior professional at work.
• Get legal advice before terminating or demoting.  Generally speaking, an employer acts lawfully when it demotes or even terminates an employee as a result of a consensual workplace relationship.  However, there are nuances.  If one gender tends to be fired or demoted by the employer when romances occur, the employer may be liable for gender discrimination.  And, an employee fired or demoted may have a sudden change of perspective and decide that the relationship was really harassment after all.  Other concerns arise if the relationship has soured and the employees are no longer able to work together.  A consultation with counsel is recommended to ensure that the company has fully accounted for any potential legal issues before taking action.

On September 15, 2014, the New York State Commissioner of Labor assigned the three-member Hospitality Industry Wage Board ("Wage Board") with the task of reviewing and making recommendations regarding what changes, if any, should be made to the minimum wage rates and tip credits for food service workers and service employees in the hospitality industry.  After conducting several meetings, the Wage Board voted on January 30, 2015, to recommend that the minimum wage rate for all tipped employees in the hospitality industry (regardless of whether they are classified as food service workers or service employees) be increased to $7.50 per hour effective December 31, 2015.  The webcast of the Wage Board's January 30 meeting can be found here. Governor Cuomo has expressed his support for the Wage Board's recommendation, which will now be reviewed by the Commissioner of Labor.  If the Commissioner of Labor accepts the Wage Board's recommendation, the Hospitality Industry Wage Order will be revised to reflect the increase. Under the current Hospitality Industry Wage Order, employers are required to pay food service workers a minimum wage of at least $5.00 per hour, and may take a tip credit of no more than $3.75 per hour, provided that the total amount of tips received plus the wages paid equals or exceeds the current regular minimum wage of $8.75 per hour.  The term "food service worker" is defined as any employee who is primarily engaged in serving food or beverages and who regularly receives tips.  This includes "front of the house" employees such as wait staff, bartenders, captains, and bussing personnel, but excludes delivery workers.  Employers are currently required to pay service employees (other employees in the hospitality industry who customarily receive tips but are not involved in serving food or beverages) a minimum wage of at least $5.65 per hour, and may take a tip credit of no more than $3.10 per hour, provided that the total amount of tips received plus the wages paid equals or exceeds $8.75 per hour.  Service employees at resort hotels are subject to a special rule that allows them to be paid a minimum wage of at least $4.90 per hour.  Non-service employees ("back of the house" employees such as cooks and dishwashers) must be paid the regular minimum wage of $8.75 per hour, and no tip credit may be taken for those employees. So, the Wage Board's recommendation (if it is accepted by the Commissioner of Labor) would drastically increase the tipped employee minimum wage as of December 31, 2015, by $2.50 for food service workers, by $1.85 for most service employees, and by $2.60 for service employees at resort hotels.  The Wage Board also voted to make two other recommendations to the Commissioner of Labor:  (1) if the legislature enacts a higher regular minimum wage for New York City, then the minimum wage for tipped employees in the hospitality industry who work in New York City would increase by $1.00 effective on the date that the higher regular minimum wage goes into effect; and (2) if a hospitality industry employer can demonstrate that the weekly average earnings of an employee (wages paid plus tips received) equals or exceeds 120% of the regular minimum wage (or 150% of the regular minimum wage if the employee works in New York City), then the employer would be eligible to pay $1.00 less than the applicable tipped employee minimum wage. Employers in the hospitality industry should begin to consider how this potentially significant increase in labor costs attributable to the employment of food service workers and service employees will impact their businesses, and should evaluate what adjustments may need to be made in the event that the Commissioner of Labor accepts and implements the Wage Board's recommendation.  We will report on any further developments as they occur.

In a victory for Home Care employers, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued consecutive decisions which struck down two regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Labor (“USDOL”) that would have eviscerated the “companionship exemption” contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The two USDOL regulations enacted in late 2013 were prevented from taking effect, as scheduled, on January 1, 2015, by two related decisions on December 22, 2014 and January 14, 2015, which vacated both regulations on the ground that they “conflicted with the [FLSA] statute itself.”  Each of the two challenged regulations would have imposed greater overtime obligations on Home Care employers, by sharply reducing the reach of the FLSA “companionship exemption,” which, for 40 years, had excluded most Home Care work from federal overtime laws. Specifically, the exemption excludes from federal minimum wage and overtime obligations companionship and live-in “services which provide fellowship, care and protection to a person who, because of advanced age or physical or mental infirmity, cannot care for his or her own needs,” unless the work is performed by a Registered Nurse or similarly trained professional. In the first of the two decisions, the District Court struck down a USDOL regulation that would have eliminated the companionship exemption unless the Home Care worker is employed directly by the patient or household itself, rather than by an Agency.  Since the vast majority of Home Care workers are employed by Home Care Agencies, this new regulation would have had sweeping impact, had it taken effect.  In striking down the regulation, the Court held that “Congress intended the exemption to apply to all employers who provide companionship and live-in domestic services. . . .”  It curtly rejected the new regulation as contrary to the statute, noting that “Congress surely did not delegate to the [USDOL] here the authority to issue a regulation that transforms defining statutory terms . . . based on who cuts a check, rather than what work is being performed.” Shortly thereafter, on January 14, 2015, the Court addressed a second USDOL regulation which redefined – and significantly narrowed – the type of work that would be covered under the companionship exemption, restricting it to only those companions who provide “care” or assist with “activities of daily living” during less than 20% of their total hours.  Since Home Care is routinely intended to provide significant assistance with activities of daily living (such as driving, meal preparation, dressing, feeding and bathing), this regulation virtually eliminated the companionship exemption.  The Court rejected the regulation on the ground that it contradicts the FLSA itself.  The statutory exemption refers to “care” and services for the elderly and disabled “who are unable to care for themselves.”  The Court determined that the USDOL regulation would “write out of the exemption the very ‘care’ the elderly and disabled need . . . .”  In a closing flourish, the Court scolded the USDOL for usurping Congressional authority:

Redefining a 40-year-old exemption out of existence may be satisfyingly efficient to the Department of Labor, but it strikes at the heart of the balance of power our Founding Fathers intended to rest in the hands of those who must face the electorate on a regular basis.

Taken together, the two decisions wholly restore the previously-existing companionship and live-in exemptions from federal minimum wage and overtime laws.  An appeal to a higher federal court may well follow, so the two decisions may not be the final word on the USDOL Regulations.  It remains prudent to continue to follow this issue closely for further development, and to consult counsel if needed. In addition, Home Care Agencies in New York should take note that, even in the absence of the applicability of federal minimum wage and overtime laws, New York law requires that home care employees be paid a minimum wage of $8.75 per hour, and requires that hours over 40 in a work week be paid at 1½ times the State minimum wage (i.e., $13.125 per hour) rather than 1½ times the employee’s regular rate.

In early December, the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP") announced the issuance of its final rule implementing Executive Order 13672, which amends Executive Order 11246 by prohibiting Federal contractors from discriminating against employees or applicants based on their sexual orientation or gender identity.  The final rule was published in the Federal Register on December 9, 2014, and will become effective April 8, 2015. The OFCCP did not release a notice of proposed rulemaking.  According to an OFCCP FAQ:  “President Obama’s Executive Order was very clear about the steps the Department of Labor was required to take, and left no discretion regarding how to proceed.  In such cases, principles of administrative law allow an agency to publish final rules without prior notice and comment when the agency only makes a required change to conform a regulation to the enabling authority, and does not have any discretion in doing so.” The regulations will apply to employers that enter into or modify Federal contracts on or after April 8, 2015.  Contractors will need to revise the equal employment opportunity clause in new or modified subcontracts or purchase orders, “ensuring that applicants and employees are treated without regard to their sexual orientation and gender identity, and by updating the equal opportunity language used in job solicitations and posting updated notices.”  OFCCP and EEOC are working together to update the EEO is the Law Poster; Federal contractors should continue to use the existing poster until a new one is finalized. Executive Order 13672 and the new final rule are in addition to the pre-existing prohibition on gender identity discrimination, which is a form of sex discrimination in violation of Executive Order 11246.  OFCCP memorialized this in an Agency Directive dated August 19, 2014. The regulations also make a change to the visa reporting provision.  Contractors that are unable to obtain a visa for an employee and believe that it is because of the employee’s sexual orientation or gender identity will be required to report it to the OFCCP and the State Department. The final rule does not require contractors to:  (1) make changes to Affirmative Action Plans; (2) collect data or set placement goals on the sexual orientation or gender identity of applicants or employees; or (3) solicit voluntary self-identification of applicants’ or employees’ sexual orientation or gender identity.  In addition, there is no change to the current religious exemption. The Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division has published on its website a list of frequently asked questions and President Obama's Press Secretary has published a fact sheet about Executive Order 13672.