Court Interprets ADAAA To Permit Disability Discrimination Claim Based on Cancer in Remission

September 28, 2010

By: Subhash Viswanathan

“In one of the first cases of its kind to make it to the summary judgment phase,” a federal district court in Indiana found last month that under the recent amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADAAA”), cancer even while in remission is a disability, Hoffman v. Carefirst of Fort Wayne Inc. The case is significant because it is one of the first cases to interpret broadly the ADAAA’s expanded definition of disability and to rely on Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) guidance in doing so. It is also significant because it imposes a reasonable accommodation obligation for an impairment that did not substantially limit a major life activity at the time the accommodation was requested.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff, Stephen Hoffman was employed as a mobile service technician. In November 2007, Hoffman was diagnosed with stage III renal cancer. In January 2008, two months after undergoing surgery to remove a kidney, Hoffman returned to work. Although Hoffman sometimes suffered from fatigue, pain, and discomfort, particularly when sitting or driving, Hoffman continued working his routine schedule without any medical restrictions.

One year later, in January 2009, Advanced Healthcare informed Hoffman that due to a new contract it had acquired, he would have to work significant overtime, travel to a different location for a night shift once a week, and be on call on weekends. Hoffman objected, claiming that the additional hours would put him “in the grave” because of his recent bout with cancer, and provided a note from his doctor stating that Hoffman could not work more than eight hours per day and no more than five days per week. Ultimately, Advanced Healthcare would not agree to provide Hoffman with the accommodation he requested. Hoffman subsequently filed a disability discrimination suit alleging that Advanced Healthcare unlawfully terminated his employment and failed to offer him a reasonable accommodation.

In its motion for summary judgment, Advanced Healthcare argued that Hoffman was not disabled because he did not have a disability which substantially limited a major life activity at the time of the relevant events. The Court disagreed, holding that it was “bound by the clear language of the ADAAA. Because it clearly provides that an ‘impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active . . ..’” With respect to the question of whether Hoffman’s cancer would have substantially limited a major life activity when it was active, the Court looked to the EEOC’s guidance, which lists cancer as a condition which substantially limits a major life activity. The Court logically concluded that “under the ADAAA, because Hoffman had cancer in remission (and that cancer would have substantially limited a major life activity when it was active), Hoffman did not need to show that he was substantially limited in a major life activity at the time of the alleged adverse employment action. As a result, his employer had an obligation to engage in the interactive process to provide him with a reasonable accommodation. The reasonable accommodation holding is, of course, simply the logical outgrowth of the Court’s determination that Hoffman had a covered disability under the ADAAA. Once that exists, the reasonable accommodation obligation follows.