In April, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Antonyuk v. James, a case challenging many of the restrictions imposed by New York’s Concealed Carry Improvement Act (CCIA). As a result, the Second Circuit’s Oct. 2024 decision which vacated all but two of the lower court’s injunctions, remains in effect.

The CCIA was passed in July of 2022 following the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, which struck down New York’s more than a century old concealed carry law. In essence, the CCIA modified the requirements for obtaining a concealed carry permit and prohibited the possession of firearms in areas deemed “sensitive” or “restricted.”

The passage of the new law prompted numerous constitutional challenges, resulting in many of its provisions being enjoined by district courts. The injunctions were then appealed to the Second Circuit which, in Dec. of 2023, released its decision in Antonyuk v. Chiumento [1].

Although the Second Circuit’s Chiumento decision was nearly identical to its later decision in James, the Supreme Court vacated the decision in July of 2024 and remanded the case back to the Second Circuit for further consideration consistent with its decision in United States v. Rahimi.

On remand, the Second Circuit released its decision in Antonyuk v. James, prompting another appeal to the Supreme Court. This time, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case, leaving the Second Circuit’s decision in effect.

In short, the Second Circuit vacated all of the injunctions except as applied to two aspects of the CCIA: (1) the provision requiring firearm license applicants to disclose the names of their current and former social media accounts; and (2) the “restricted locations” provision, to the extent that it made it presumptively unlawful to carry a firearm on private Property open to the general public  unless permission was granted by “clear and conspicuous signage” or express verbal consent. 

The case will now be remanded back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Second Circuit’s opinion. For now, all provisions of the CCIA will remain in effect except for the two provisions that remain enjoined.

It is important to note that the Second Circuit’s review merely assessed the lower court’s injunctions, conducting a narrow analysis of whether the challenged provisions were facially unconstitutional. Therefore, future challenges to the CCIA are inevitable.

We will continue to provide updates regarding this issue. If you have any questions regarding the effects of this legislation, please contact Nicholas Jacobson, Colin Smith, any attorney in Bond’s Labor and Employment practice or the attorney at the firm with whom you are regularly in contact.

[1] Antonyuk v. Chiumento consolidated four district court cases (Antonyuk v. Hochul from the Northern District of New York; Christian v. Nigrelli, Spencer v. Nigrelli, and Hardaway v. Nigrelli from the Western District of New York). Only the Antonyuk parties appealed to the Supreme Court, so the Chiumento decision as applied to Christian, Spencer, and Hardaway was unaffected by the Supreme Court’s subsequent vacatur.  As a result, the primary difference between the Second Circuit’s decisions in Chiumento and James is that James did not address the injunctions issued in Christian, Spencer, and Hardaway.

It is common practice across the country for employees to be paid every other week or twice per month, because that imposes much less time and manpower on an employer than running payroll weekly. But such a practice can subject certain employers in New York to liability. Section 191 of the New York Labor Law (NYLL) requires employers to pay employees who fall under the broad definition of “manual worker” to pay such employees weekly. For a long time, there was little to no private litigation against an employer who paid such workers biweekly or semimonthly; such employers would simply pay a penalty if cited by the NY Department of Labor.

That changed in 2019 when New York’s Appellate Division, First Department held that a manual worker could bring a suit in court seeking damages for not being paid on a weekly basis. This resulted in a wave of “frequency of pay” litigation claims. The reason is that Section 198 of the New York Labor Law allows individuals to recover liquidated damages up to 100% of the total amount of any unpaid wages. So, for example, a manual worker paid $2,000 biweekly, instead of $1,000 weekly, would seek liquidated damages in the amount of $1,000 for each week not paid weekly—even though the employee received their full pay every other week. Because of New York’s long, six-year statute of limitations for such claims, this created a large amount of liability for any employer that did not pay manual workers weekly.  An employer with a 200 employee workforce could find themselves subject to a $30 million, bankrupt-the-company lawsuit.

Employers were initially hopeful early last year when the Appellate Division, Second Department came to the exact opposite decision of the First Department, finding that a manual worker could not bring a suit in court for a frequency of pay violation. However, this only created a split among the courts that has not been resolved, and the issue has not yet reached the Court of Appeals. Likewise, talks of a legislative fix last year ultimately fizzled out.

However, both the Governor’s office and Legislature took up the issue this year. As we previously reported here, Governor Hochul included legislation amending the damages available under Section 198 of NYLL for frequency of pay violations in her proposed budget for the 2026 fiscal year. On May 7, the Education, Labor and Family Assistance (ELFA) budget bill was published, and while it revised some provisions from the Governor’s initial proposal, it still limits the damages of frequency of pay actions.

The bill amends Section 198 of NYLL to clarify that liquidated damages shall not be applicable to violations of the weekly payment requirement for manual workers set forth in Section 191 of NYLL where the employer paid the employee wages on a regular payday, no less frequently than semimonthly. Instead, the bill sets forth that such violations are limited to “lost interest found to be due for the delayed payments of wages calculated at the daily interest rate for each day payment is late based on the annual rate of interest then in effect.” The interest rate is set by the Department Financial Services under Section 14-a of the Bank Law and is currently sixteen percent per annum.

Further, for conduct occurring after the effective date of the amendment, liquidated damages may be sought in an amount equal to one hundred percent of the “total amount of wages found to be due” in a Section 191 frequency of pay violation for employers who had been the subject of one or more findings and orders of a frequency of pay violation.

Finally, the bill states that it “shall take effect immediately and shall apply to causes of action pending or commenced on or after such date”—and it was just signed into law on May 9, and is therefore already in effect.

What does this mean? Immediately, for any pending cases, so long as employees were paid their full pay biweekly or semimonthly, the potential liability will drop drastically. For the hypothetical 200 employee employer described above, the potential liability would drop from about $30 million in liquidated damages to less than $100,000 in interest.  Of course, were an employer to be found liable for a frequency of pay violation in the future and not fix their weekly pay issue, the next time an employer would face on hundred percent liquidated damages of “the total amount of wages found to be due.”

Given the immediate impact this will have on pending cases, it is possible that the law’s provision that it will apply to pending causes of action may be challenged.

Bond continues to follow these developments closely and will continue to provide updates as they occur. Please contact a Bond attorney in the labor and employment practice or the Bond attorney with whom you normally work, for questions, concerns and tailored consultation.

On April 23, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order titled “Restoring Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy” (the Order). Through this Executive Order, and accompanying Fact Sheet, the Trump Administration characterizes disparate impact liability as unlawful and states that it “not only undermines our national values but also runs contrary to equal protection under the law and, therefore, violates our Constitution.”  The Order bars federal agencies from relying on the disparate impact theory in their enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (addressing employment discrimination) and Title VI (addressing discrimination in education), and seeks to eliminate its use “in all contexts to the maximum degree possible.”

Under Title VII and other civil rights laws, discrimination claims may be made under two main theories: disparate treatment (which involves intentional discrimination) and disparate impact (which addresses unintentional discrimination). Under the disparate-impact theory, policies or practices that appear to be facially neutral may still be found to be discriminatory if they disproportionately and adversely affect members of a protected class. The theory was first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., which held that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination, but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation.” When faced with a disparate impact claim in the employment context, employers must show that the challenged policy or practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity.

The disparate impact theory was codified into the statutory provisions of Title VII in 1991. (42 U.S.C. 200e-2(k)). While the disparate impact theory is not explicitly addressed in the statutory provisions of Title VI, disparate impact is recognized in its implementing regulations. Over the past several decades, disparate-impact liability has become engrained in civil rights laws that touch a wide variety of fields, including employment, access to credit, government contracting, housing and education.

The Order states that “disparate-impact liability has hindered businesses from making hiring and other employment decisions based on merit and skill” and “imperils the effectiveness of civil rights laws by mandating, rather than proscribing, discrimination.”

The Order reflects a fundamental shift in the enforcement of civil rights law by focusing exclusively on intentional discrimination and outlines the following directives to federal agencies:

• Deprioritize the enforcement of all statutes and regulations to the extent that they include disparate-impact liability;
• Identify and repeal regulations or guidance that utilize the disparate impact framework (this appears to apply not just to Title VI, but also to Title VII, the Fair Housing Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act);
• Roll back the implementation of Title VI for all agencies with respect to disparate impact liability, which shall include revocation of the Presidential approval of Department of Justice Title VI regulations that address disparate-impact liability;
• Review pending investigations, civil suits, injunctions and consent decrees in which the government has relied upon disparate impact theory and “take appropriate action with respect to such matters” consistent with the policy of the Order;
• Examine whether state laws using the disparate impact theory may be preempted by federal authority or whether such “laws, regulations, policies or practices have constitutional infirmities that warrant Federal action.”

The Order may be of particular interest to employers because of the potential impact on employment practices, and its effect on currently pending cases, audits and investigations  that the government has brought based on a disparate-impact liability theory. However, due to the extensive case law that has explicitly recognized the disparate-impact theory, private individuals will likely still be allowed to pursue disparate impact claims, provided courts continue to recognize them as legally cognizable.

In the Fact Sheet accompanying the Order, President Trump is described as “a champion of individual merit and fairness” and the shift away from disparate impact is suggested to be part of a broader philosophy that aligns with President Trump’s other recent executive orders aimed at eliminating affirmative action and diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) programs. Many of those previous orders have faced legal challenges and, in some cases, have been enjoined. It is possible that this Order may face similar legal challenges. 

Bond continues to follow these and related developments closely. Please contact Christa Cook, Gavin Gretsky or the Bond attorney with whom you normally work, with any questions.

On April 9, 2025, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued guidance stating that it will begin considering individuals’ antisemitic activity on social media and the physical harassment of Jewish individuals as grounds for denying immigration benefit requests.  According to the news release, “[t]his will immediately affect aliens applying for lawful permanent resident status, foreign students and aliens affiliated with educational institutions linked to antisemitic activity.”

Under this guidance, USCIS will consider social media content that indicates that a non-citizen endorses, espouses, promotes or supports antisemitic terrorism, antisemitic terrorist organizations, or other antisemitic activity as a negative factor in any USCIS discretionary analysis when adjudicating immigration benefits. This guidance took effect immediately on April 9.

This guidance stems from President Trump’s executive orders on Combatting Anti-Semitism (issued in 2019), Additional Measures to Combat Anti-Semitism and Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorist and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats (both issued in 2025).  To effectuate the directives of these executive orders, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has stated that it will enforce the existing “relevant immigration laws to the maximum degree, to protect the homeland from extremists and terrorist aliens, including those who support antisemitic terrorism, violent antisemitic ideologies and antisemitic terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Ansar Allah aka: ‘the Houthis.’”  Hamas and Hezbollah were designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) in 1997, Palestinian Islamic Jihad in 2014 and the Houthis in March 2025.

Under U.S. immigration law, both the USCIS and DOS have the authority to deny immigration benefits, including the issuance of a visa, entry into the United States, and permanent resident status, if a foreign national applicant has engaged in, among other things, various types of unlawful conduct or crimes or is a member of, or has assisted, any terrorist or other armed organization or is otherwise suspected of intending to do, or, having done, those things.  For decades, any foreign national who has completed a visa application or a permanent residence application is asked many questions concerning their past, present and future activities, including whether they are terrorists and/or are members of, or have provided or intend to aid terrorist organizations.  For example, the Form DS-160, the nonimmigrant visa application form used by foreign nationals to apply for a visa to enter the United States, includes the following questions:

• Do you seek to engage in terrorist activities in the United States or have you ever engaged in terrorist activities?
• Have you ever or do you intend to provide financial assistance or other support to terrorists or terrorist organizations?
• Have you ever committed, ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in extrajudicial killings, political killings or other acts of violence? 

Although affirmative answers (without sufficient ameliorating explanation(s)) will likely result in denial of the immigration benefit being sought or requested, lying about such activities will also result in denial or revocation of the benefit.

For the past decade, starting with a 2015 pilot program, USCIS has monitored and screened applicants’ social media accounts in connection with their applications for immigration benefits.  In 2016, President Obama established the Social Media Division within the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate of USCIS, which is responsible for identifying, reviewing, vetting and adjudicating cases involving national security concerns.  The Social Media Division conducts social media screenings of applicants for immigration benefits to identify security risks and to detect fraud.  Presumably, the Social Media Division will also be tasked with monitoring the activities described in this April 9th guidance issued by the USCIS.

Takeaways

Scrutiny of social media accounts for national security purposes, including the identification of terrorists and support for terrorist activity, has been a part of the visa application and immigration benefits vetting process since the Obama Administration.  The issuance of this guidance is a reminder that such monitoring occurs and that negative determinations on immigration applications may occur if social media accounts and posts reveal support for antisemitic terrorism, violent antisemitic ideologies or antisemitic terrorist organizations.

Please contact your Bond immigration attorney if you have any questions related to this information memo.

On April 11, 2025, a new rule went into effect in which the United States government will start to strictly enforce the requirement that foreign nationals register their presence with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and be fingerprinted if they remain in the United States for 30 days or longer.

Since the 1940s, U.S. immigration law has required all aliens 14 years of age or older (with certain limited exceptions) who remain in the United States for 30 days or longer to register their presence in the United States and to be fingerprinted, if they were not already fingerprinted when applying for a U.S. visa.[1]  Most foreign nationals who visit the United States have complied with this requirement through the visa application process, the permanent residence application process, or the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) entry process. USCIS will now start enforcing this requirement for those individuals who have not gone through these registration processes. The two main groups who have not gone through these registration processes and are primarily affected by the new rule are:  (1) Canadians who enter through land ports-of-entry and are not required to obtain visas to enter the United States; and (2) foreign nationals who entered the United States before they turned 14 and who have remained in the United States after turning 14.

On March 12, 2025, pursuant to President Trump’s January 20, 2025 Protecting the American People Against Invasion executive order directing the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure compliance with the alien registration requirement, DHS issued an Interim Final Rule (IFR)[2] that (1) requires all aliens 14 or over in the U.S. for 30 days or longer to register their physical presence in the U.S. and provide their fingerprints (if they have not already done so), (2) creates a new online registration system and (3) establishes significant penalties for failure to register. These new requirements and systems went into effect on April 11, 2025. 

This article discusses who is and who is not affected by this IFR, how to comply with the IFR, and the consequences of failing to do so.

Who Does Not Need to Register?

Most nonimmigrant and immigrant visa holders are not required to undertake this physical presence registration process and be fingerprinted under the IFR because they have already complied with these requirements through the visa application and ESTA travel authorization process. The groups of individuals who are not required to register include the following:

• Foreign nationals staying in the United States fewer than 30 days;
• Lawful permanent residents;
• Nonimmigrants who were admitted to the United States and were issued a Form I-94 (electronic or paper) or Form I-94W;
• Any non-citizen who has been issued an employment authorization document;
• Any non-citizen who has applied for U.S. permanent residence and has attended a biometrics appointment;
• A and G visa holders;
• American Indians born in Canada who possess at least 50% blood of the American Indian race and who are present in the U.S. under the authority of 8 United States Code Section 1359[RPA4] [GD5];
• Visitors admitted under ESTA; and
• Any non-citizen issued a border crossing card.

Who Must Register?

Those who must register under the IFR include all foreign nationals who remain in the U.S. for more than 30 days who have not gone through a registration and fingerprinting process in connection with an application for a nonimmigrant visa, employment authorization, permanent residence or admission into the U.S. through ESTA. These groups include the following:

• Foreign nationals remaining in the U.S. 30 days or more who enter the United States without a visa or who don’t receive a Form I-94 record (paper or electronic);
• Foreign nationals who enter the U.S. without inspection and who have not been fingerprinted in connection with any immigration application;
• Non-US citizen children under the age of 14 who have not previously registered and will remain in the U.S. for 30 days or more. Minor children will be issued proof of registration but are not required to be fingerprinted until they turn 14; and
• All non-U.S. citizen children, regardless of previous registration, who turn 14 years old in the U.S., must update their registration and be fingerprinted within 30 days after their 14th birthday, including:
  • Permanent residents who obtained their green cards when below age 14 are required to register and complete fingerprinting by submitting a Form I-90 once they reach 14 years old.
  • Non immigrant children who turn 14 while they are in the United States. Once the child turns 14, they will need to comply with the new requirement within 30 days of their birthday, even if they have previously received a Form I-94 admission record.

Registration Procedure

Those who need to register must use the Form G-325R, which must be submitted online through an individual USCIS account. The procedure is as follows:

1. Create a USCIS account in the “myUSCIS” online platform by going to the following website: https://www.uscis.gov/file-online/how-to-create-a-uscis-online-account.
2. Select “File a Form Online” and then choose “Form G-325R” from the dropdown menu.
3. Follow the instructions to complete the Form G-325R, upload any supporting evidence. and submit the completed form once ready.
4. USCIS will issue a receipt notice once the Form G-325R has been submitted, which should be retained as proof of registration
5. Completing the Form G-325R registration will initiate the scheduling of a biometrics appointment.
6. Attend the biometrics appointment, bringing the appointment notice and a photo identification to the appointment.
7. Upon completion of the biometrics, retain the biometrics appointment notice which has been endorsed by USCIS as proof of having completed the fingerprinting.

Evidence of Registration and Penalties

The new rules require that all non-U.S. citizens over the age of 18 carry proof their registration.  For those who register under the process described above, the G-325R receipt notice and the endorsed biometrics appointment notice would constitute such evidence. For others who are not required to register under that process it might be their Form I-94, a permanent resident card or other documentation that the individual has received from USCIS.

Failure to register and/or to present valid proof may result in civil penalties of up to $5,000, imprisonment of up to 6 months, or both. Parents and/or guardians who fail to register minor children may also be held liable and subject to these same penalties.

Takeaways

Canadian citizens who enter the United States by land and who remain in the United States for more than 30 days should be cognizant of these registration requirements and make sure that they are in compliance. Similarly, parents of non-citizen children who will turn 14 should make sure to timely register their minor children’s presence in the United States in accordance with the procedures discussed above using the USCIS online account system.

Finally, as a reminder, it is important to understand that undergoing and/or completing this registration process does not confer lawful immigration status or the right to remain in the United States, nor do the documents issued as part of this registration process provide the right to remain in the United States, employment authorization to work in the United States, or any other right or benefit under the U.S. immigration laws. These documents are only proof that the individual has complied with the physical registration requirements.

Please contact your Bond, Schoeneck King, PLLC Immigration attorney if you have any questions regarding registration requirements and the registration process.

[1] The current law, Section 262 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. 1302), was enacted in 1952.

[2]https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/12/2025-03944/alien-registration-form-and-evidence-of-registration#:~:text=DATES%3A-,Effective%20date%3A%20This%20IFR%20is%20effective%20April%2011%2C%202025.,received%20by%20April%2011%2C%202025

On March 19, 2025, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) released two technical assistance documents focused on educating the public about unlawful discrimination related to diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) in the workplace: a one-page technical assistance document, “What To Do If You Experience Discrimination Related to DEI at Work,” and a question-and-answer technical assistance document, “What You should Know About DEI-Related Discrimination at Work.” EEOC Acting Chair Andrea Lucas emphasized that these technical assistance documents will help employees know their rights and help employers take action to avoid unlawful DEI-related discrimination.

In the technical assistance documents, the EEOC emphasized that DEI is a broad term not defined in Title VII and noted that under Title VII, DEI initiatives, policies, programs or practices may be unlawful if they involve an employer or other covered entity taking an employment action motivated—in whole or in part—by an employee’s or applicant’s sex, race or another protected characteristic. The EEOC further noted that Title VII protects employees, potential and actual applicants, interns and training and apprenticeship program participants.

The documents provide some examples of employer actions that might create DEI-related claims, including:

• Limiting, Segregating and Classifying. Separating employees into groups based on race, sex or another protected characteristic when administering DEI or other trainings or other privileges of employment, even if the separate groups receive the same programming content or amount of employer resources. Limiting membership in workplace groups like Employee Resource Groups (ERG) or other employee affinity groups, to certain protected groups (including by making available company time, facilities or premises, and other forms of official or unofficial encouragement or participation).
• Disparate Treatment. Discriminating against applicants or employees in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment, including hiring, selection for interviews (including placement or exclusion from a candidate “slate” or pool), access to or exclusion from training (including training characterized as leadership development programs), internships (including those labeled as “fellowships” or “summer associate” programs”), mentoring/sponsorship programs, access to workplace networking/networks, etc.
• Retaliation. Retaliating against employees who oppose DEI programs or trainings. Reasonable opposition to a DEI training may constitute a protected activity if the employee provides a fact-specific basis for his or her belief that the training violates Title VII.
• Harassment. Harassment during DEI training which, depending on the facts, may lead to a colorable hostile work environment claim.

Additional key takeaways from the documents:

• Reverse discrimination. The EEOC’s position is that there is no such thing as reverse discrimination, noting that there is only discrimination. The EEOC does not require a higher showing of proof for so-called reverse discrimination claims. It applies the same standard of proof to all race discrimination claims, regardless of the race of the victim.
• No business necessity exception for DEI programs. The EEOC noted that Title VII allows employers to raise a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) as an affirmative defense in very limited circumstances to excuse hiring or classifying any individual based on religion, sex or national origin. However, the EEOC emphasized that Title VII does not provide any diversity interest exception to these rules, noting that no general business interest in diversity and equity (including perceived operational benefits or customer/client preference) has ever been found by the Supreme Court to be sufficient to allow race-motivated employment actions.
• No excuse for DEI-related considerations of race, sex or other protected characteristic. For there to be unlawful discrimination, race or sex (or any other protected characteristic under Title VII) does not have to be the sole reason for an employer’s employment action or the but-for (deciding) factor for the action. Under Title VII, an employment action is still unlawful even if race, sex or another protected characteristic was only one factor among many contributing to the employer’s decision or action.
• Covered entities under Title VII. Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees, employment agencies (including staffing agencies), entities that operate training programs (including on-the-job training programs) and labor organizations (like unions). Additionally, employers can be liable for the actions of their agents, such as staffing agencies and recruiters.

Bond continues to follow these and related developments closely. Please contact Adam P. Mastroleo, Anthony A. Levitskiy or the Bond attorney with whom you normally work, for questions, concerns and tailored consultation. 

On Feb. 21, 2025, the federal district court for the District of Maryland issued a preliminary injunction partially enjoining two of President Trump’s executive orders: Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing (Jan. 20, 2025)(J20 Order) and Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity (Jan. 21, 2025)(J21 Order).

The Court’s ruling focused on three provisions of the executive orders:

• The “Termination Provision” of the J20 Order directing federal agencies to terminate “equity-related” grants and contracts;
• The “Certification Provision” of the J21 Order directing federal agencies to require federal contractors and grantees to certify under penalty of the False Claims Act that they do not operate programs promoting DEI that violate discrimination laws; and
• The “Enforcement Threat Provision” of the J21 Order directing the Attorney General to take actions to “deter DEI programs or principles . . . that constitute illegal discrimination or preferences,” including drafting a report recommending actions and identifying corporations, higher education institutions or certain other entities for “civil compliance investigations.”

The plaintiffs in the case are the National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education, the American Association of University Professors, Restaurant Opportunities Centers United, and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. The Court ruled that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on their claims that the J20 and J21 executive orders suffered from an unconstitutional vagueness and that they abridge freedom of speech, among other infirmities. The Court also found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed if the executive orders were to be implemented while further judicial proceedings are held to ultimately determine the legality of the executive orders. The Court went on to find that a nationwide injunction was appropriate.

Therefore, the Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing federal agencies from:

• Freezing, terminating or changing the terms of any existing grants or contracts, on the basis of the Termination Provision in the J20 Order;
• Requiring any grantee or contractor to make any “certification” or other representation pursuant to the Certification Provision; and
• Bringing any “False Claims Act enforcement action, or other enforcement action,” pursuant to the Enforcement Threat Provision.

Notably, the scope of the injunction issued by the Court was not as all-encompassing as the plaintiffs had requested. The Court expressly declined to enjoin the Attorney General from preparing a report of recommendations on strategic steps to “encourage the private sector to end illegal discrimination and preferences, including DEI” or from engaging in investigations of potential violations federal anti-discrimination laws pursuant to the Enforcement Threat Provision.

As a result of the Court’s ruling, there is less immediate concern that federal grants or contracts will be interrupted on the basis that they fund “equity-related” activities or that a grantee or contractor will be subject to the threat of the False Claims Act for engaging in DEI programs or policies. On its face, the scope of the Court’s ruling is quite broad, as it prevents not only False Claims Act actions but also “any other enforcement action.”

The ruling is not a final ruling and could be reversed on appeal or altered by the court itself, in whole or in part, as the matter proceeds. Thus, issues raised by the J20 and J21 executive orders are worth reviewing, although some of the immediacy is removed at this time.

In addition, one should not assume that the Court’s injunction addresses all legal concerns with respect to DEI programs and policies currently in place. As a general matter, an entity engages in unlawful discrimination when it makes decisions based on an individual’s race, color, ethnicity, sex or various other protected characteristics. Despite the Court’s preliminary injunction, there remains the risk of liability based on illegal discrimination, even if the illegal discrimination resulted from well-intentioned efforts to increase diversity. Stated another way, some programs and policies may have had compliance issues before the J20 and J21 executive orders and those issues are not affected by the preliminary injunction and should be assessed and addressed if warranted.

As before this latest development, DEI programs, policies and initiatives should be reviewed to ensure their compliance with existing anti-discrimination law. Close attention should also be paid to the rapidly occurring developments against the backdrop of enforcement actions by both federal and state officials, funding and reimbursement implications of the programs and the possibility of private litigation.

Bond continues to follow these and related developments closely. Please contact a Bond attorney in the labor and employment practice or the Bond attorney with whom you normally work, for questions, concerns and tailored consultation. 

Under New York Labor Law Section 191, individuals who fall under the broad definition of “manual worker” must receive their wages weekly. There is currently a split among the courts as to whether manual workers have a private right of action to recover liquidated damages for untimely payments. In Vega v. CM & Associates Construction Management, LLC, the First Department held that manual workers who were paid late had a private right of action under Section 198 of New York Labor Law to recover liquidated damages for up to six years of their wages. Conversely, in Grant v. Global Aircraft Dispatch Inc., the Second Department held that Section 198 does not create a private right of action for late payment when the employee is still paid in full.

Despite the lack of clarity in the law as to whether manual workers have a private right of action, there has been a surge in individual and class-action lawsuits that could expose employers to substantial liability, requiring them to pay employees who were already paid in full, albeit not on a weekly basis. Governor Hochul has included legislation in her proposed budget for the 2026 fiscal year to address this issue.

Governor Hochul’s proposed legislation would clarify the damages available to manual workers for untimely payments. First-time violations allow for the recovery of 100% of interest lost due to delayed payments. Second-time violations would allow for the recovery of 300% of the lost interest due to delayed payment. Finally, for all subsequent violations, recovery includes liquidated damages equal to 100% of the total amount of wages due to the employee. This legislation would limit plaintiffs’ recovery of liquidated damages and prevent financial harm to employers who have paid employees the correct amount on a biweekly schedule. If enacted, Section U would take effect 60 days after approval. Similar legislation on how to remedy the frequency of pay controversy was proposed in the 2025 fiscal year budget, but did not pass.

The 2026 budget must be approved by April 1, 2025, and we will continue to provide updates regarding this issue. If you have any questions regarding the effects of this legislation, please contact Nicholas Jacobson, any attorney in Bond’s labor and employment practice or the attorney at the firm with whom you are regularly in contact.

On Feb. 5, 2025, President Trump signed an Executive Order, “Keeping Men Out of Women’s Sports.”  The Executive Order states that “[i]n recent years, many educational institutions and athletic associations have allowed men to compete in women’s sports,” a situation that the Order states has denied women and girls equal athletic opportunity.

The Executive Order states:

“Therefore, it is the policy of the United States to rescind all funds from educational programs that deprive women and girls of fair athletic opportunities, which results in the endangerment, humiliation, and silencing of women and girls and deprives them of privacy. It shall also be the policy of the United States to oppose male competitive participation in women’s sports more broadly, as a matter of safety, fairness, dignity, and truth.”

This Executive Order follows another order signed by the President on Jan. 20, 2025, “Defending Women From Gender Ideology Extremism And Restoring Biological Truth To The Federal Government,” which sets more broadly the federal government’s position that there are two immutable biological binary sexes, male and female, and that the Executive Branch will enforce all sex-protective laws accordingly.

Effective Feb. 5, 2025, the Executive Order directs the Secretary of Education to:

• Enforce Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to “affirmatively protect all-female athletic opportunities and all-female locker rooms,” including through regulations and policy guidance; and
• Prioritize Title IX enforcement actions against educational institutions and athletic institutions composed of or governed by educational institutions that deny women an equal opportunity to participate in athletics by “requiring them, in the women’s category, to compete with or against or to appear unclothed before males.”

The Executive Order also directs all executive departments and agencies to review grants and educational programs and “where appropriate” to “rescind funding to programs that fail to comply with the policy established in this order.”

The Executive Order may be challenging for educational institutions, particularly those with transgender female students currently participating on girls and women’s teams. Additionally, in jurisdictions with state or local laws, including the State of New York, that extend rights based on gender identity, the Executive Order conditions federal funding on actions that may be inconsistent with state and local laws. College and university leadership should consult with legal counsel about the impact of this Executive Order on their athletic programs.

Bond attorneys are following these, and related legal developments, closely. If your institution would like further guidance, please reach out to an attorney in our higher education practice or the Bond attorney with whom you are regularly in contact.

On Jan. 21, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order titled “Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity” (the Order). Among other changes, the Order revokes Executive Order 11246 (EO 11246), which governs federal contractors and subcontractors.

EO 11246, which was signed into law in 1965 by Lyndon B. Johnson, has been enforced by the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP). EO 11246 prohibited federal contractors, subcontractors and federally assisted construction contractors, who did over $10,000 in business with the federal government, from discriminating in employment decisions and required them to take affirmative action to ensure equal opportunity without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or national origin. In addition, certain federal contractors who had contracts above a certain monetary threshold were also obligated to implement a written affirmative action program (AAP). Covered federal contractors obligated to maintain written AAPs were required to certify on the OFCCP's online Contractor Portal, on an annual basis, that they developed and were in compliance with the AAP mandates.

The Order not only rescinds EO 11246, but also directs OFCCP to immediately cease:

1. Promoting “diversity”;
2. Holding federal contractors and subcontractors responsible for taking “affirmative action”; and
3. Allowing or encouraging federal contractors and subcontractors to engage in workforce balancing based on race, color, sex, sexual preference, religion or national origin.

The Order also requires federal agencies to include in every contract or grant award a term requiring the contractor/grantee to “certify that it does not operate any programs promoting DEI that violate any applicable Federal anti-discrimination laws.”

Federal contractors must comply with the Order within 90 days. While we are continuing to analyze the implications of the revocation of EO 11246, many questions remain, including the impact on federal contractors currently undergoing an OFCCP audit or compliance review.

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (covering individuals with disabilities) and the Vietnam-Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 (covering protected veterans), which are also enforced by OFCCP, prohibit discrimination in employment and require certain federal contractors to develop written affirmative action plans. Those affirmative action obligations for individuals with disabilities and protected veterans, which are not found in EO 11246, do not appear to be impacted by President Trump’s Order and will remain in effect.

If you have any questions, please contact Christa Richer Cook, any attorney in the firm’s labor and employment practice, or the Bond attorney with whom you have regular contact.

On Dec. 18, 2024, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced a final rule introducing significant changes to the H-1B nonimmigrant visa program. This rule aims to modernize the H-1B process, improve program efficiency, offer new benefits and flexibilities, and implement enhanced integrity measures. While the changes primarily affect H-1B specialty occupation workers, other nonimmigrant classifications, including H-2, H-3, F-1, L-1, O, P, Q-1, R-1, E-3 and TN categories, will also see impacts.

Key Updates

The new H-1B eligibility requirements and accompanying changes will apply to petitions filed on or after Jan. 17, 2025. At that time, USCIS will require a revised Form I-129 for all filings. A preview of the updated form is currently available on the USCIS website.

In response to public comments, USCIS highlighted several key revisions and removals from the proposed rule (NPRM) in the final regulation. One significant change involves the definition of “specialty occupation.” The proposed rule previously specified that if a petitioner required only a general degree, such as “business administration” or “liberal arts,” without further specialization, the occupation would not qualify as an H-1B “specialty occupation.” References to these degrees were removed in the final rule. This change shifts focus to the “beneficiary’s actual course of study” rather than solely the degree title, emphasizing the relevance of the education to the job.

Under the final rule, a position qualifies as an H-1B “specialty occupation” if it requires the theoretical and practical application of highly specialized knowledge and mandates at least a bachelor’s degree in a “directly related” specific specialty or its equivalent. A “directly related” degree is defined as one with a “logical connection between the required degree and the duties of the position.”

For positions where a bachelor’s degree in a specific specialty is “normally” the minimum requirement, petitioners do not need to prove that it is always the minimum. DHS clarified that “normal” is interpreted as “usual, typical, common, or routine,” and rejected a proposal to use the preponderance of the evidence standard (“more likely than not”) for this determination.

When petitioners specify a range of acceptable degree fields, they must demonstrate that each field is “directly related” to the job’s duties. Each degree must equip the beneficiary with the specialized knowledge required to perform the job. The petitioner bears the burden of proving how each field of study represents a “specific specialty” directly connected to the position’s responsibilities.

USCIS has also updated the requirements for H-1B cap exemptions. Nonprofit and governmental research organizations must now demonstrate that research is a “fundamental activity” rather than their primary mission.

To qualify for the ACWIA fee exemption, a nonprofit organization must now be recognized by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as tax-exempt under sections 501(c)(3), (c)(4) or (c)(6). Previously, regulations required that nonprofits not only be tax-exempt under these IRS sections but also have specifically obtained IRS approval for tax-exempt status for research or educational purposes.

USCIS has removed the requirement for detailed itineraries covering the full validity period of the petition. However, petitioners must still establish that the position will exist as of the start date. For third-party placements, specialty occupation requirements will now be based on the job criteria of the third-party organization. Supporting evidence such as contracts, statements of work, or client letters will remain necessary.

Expanded authority for site visits will allow USCIS to inspect not only petitioner worksites but also third-party locations and private residences where remote work occurs. Refusal to cooperate during site visits may lead to petition denial or revocation.

Amended petition requirements have been clarified to codify existing guidance, including when new Labor Condition Applications (LCAs) are unnecessary (e.g., for short-term placements). USCIS has also codified its deference policy, meaning prior determinations involving the same parties and facts will generally be deferred to, barring material errors, changes or new adverse information.

Under the new rule, H-1B Cap-Gap extensions may continue until April 1 of the fiscal year for which the non-frivolous petition was filed or until the start date of the H-1B petition if approved, whichever occurs first. Previously, H-1B Cap-Gap extensions lasted until Sept. 30, the day before the start of the fiscal year associated with the petition.

The new rule under 8 CFR 214.2(h)(9)(ii) adds a provision for H-1B petitions approved after the requested validity period. USCIS may issue an RFE allowing petitioners to amend the dates. If the new dates exceed the Labor Condition Application (LCA) validity, a new LCA must be submitted. Changes to employment dates or wage increases are not considered material changes if the position remains the same. If no amendment is requested or no RFE is issued/replied to, the petition is approved for the original period without status changes or extensions.

Action Items

We recommend that clients review current and planned filings in light of these new rules. For those with upcoming H-1B or other nonimmigrant petitions, it is critical to prepare for the changes to eligibility requirements, updated forms and enhanced compliance measures.

If you have any questions, please contact Kseniya Premo, any attorney in the firm’s immigration or labor and employment practices, or the Bond attorney with whom you have regular contact. We are here to help ensure a smooth transition and compliance with the new regulations

As we approach the end of 2024, employers in New Jersey should be preparing for the implementation of new employment and business laws and regulations in the upcoming year. This article provides an overview of some significant changes and updates in the law set to take effect in 2025, though it is not a fully comprehensive list.

1. Minimum Wage Increases: Effective Jan. 1, 2025, the minimum wage will increase by $0.36 to $15.49 per hour for most employees. N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a4. For tipped workers, the minimum wage will increase to $5.62 per hour, up from $5.26. The maximum tip credit for employers remains at $9.87. N.J.S.A. 12:56-3.5.
2. Pay Transparency: On Nov. 18, 2024, Governor Phil Murphy signed a new statute requiring employers with at least 10 employees to include wage or salary information, or a compensation range, in any posting for a promotion, new job or transfer. The law, effective June 1, 2025, also requires employers to list benefits and other compensation programs for which the employee would be eligible within the employee’s first 12 months of employment.
3. Gender Neutral Dress Code Policies: On June 28, 2024, the New Jersey Attorney General and New Jersey Division of Civil Rights Director announced that businesses are mandated to adopt gender neutral dress codes for patrons and employees. This decision comes after the Division on Civil Rights issued a finding of probable cause where a restaurant refused to adopt a gender-neutral dress code. As part of the consent order, the restaurant agreed to modify its dress code for both employees and customers. Employers should reevaluate and modify any existing dress code policies and/or handbooks to ensure compliance with the new standards set forth by the Attorney General’s Office.
4. New Jersey Data Protection Act: Starting Jan. 15, 2025, New Jersey will require covered entities to: (1) limit the collection of personal data to what is adequate, relevant and reasonably necessary; (2) implement reasonable data security practices; (3) provide privacy notices; (4) allow consumers to revoke consent for  processing; (5) conduct data protection impact assessments; and (6) maintain records of data protection assessments. C.56:8-166.12. Covered entities include: (a) entities that conduct business in New Jersey or produce products or services targeted to New Jersey; and (b) control or process the personal data of at least 100,000 consumers (not including personal data controlled solely for the purpose of completing a payment transaction), or control or process the personal data of at least 25,000 consumers and derive revenue or receive a discount on the price of any goods or services from the sale of personal data. C.56:8-166.5. “Consumers” are defined as a person that is a resident of New Jersey, not acting in a commercial or employment context. C.56:8-166.4(1). The Office of the Attorney General has the sole and exclusive authority to enforce a violation of the New Jersey Data Protection Act (“NJDPA”), which are considered violations of the Consumer Fraud Act. C.56:8-166.19.  Penalties for a first violation are up to $10,000 and up to $20,000 for subsequent violations. Given the expansive nature of this new privacy law, New Jersey businesses should consider reviewing their company’s personal data policy and retention practices.

Key Takeaways

Given these recent and forthcoming changes in New Jersey law, employers should take steps to update their employee handbooks, ensure their job postings meet compliance standards, and adjust their hiring procedures to align with updated policies and wage practices. Furthermore, New Jersey’s new far reaching cyber privacy law will require businesses to review their data privacy policies and data collection processes to ensure compliance.

If you have any questions or would like additional information regarding any policy updates, or other legal developments, please contact Samuel Dobre, Mallory Campbell, Patrick Caldarelli or any attorney in Bond’s labor and employment practice.