Second Circuit Revises the Standard for Title VII Religious Accommodation Claims
July 29, 2026
By: Adam P. Mastroleo Anthony A. Levitskiy
On July 15, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) issued a decision in Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System (Bergin), holding that the United States Supreme Court's 2015 decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie) effectively overruled the Second Circuit's longstanding framework for analyzing religious accommodation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).
Background
In September 2021, Jessica Bergin (Ms. Bergin), a court officer for the New York State Unified Court System (UCS), submitted a request for religious exemption from UCS’s COVID-19 vaccine requirement. Because Ms. Bergin’s request identified concerns about stem cells and bodily integrity, as well as some non-religious objections to the vaccine requirement, UCS requested that she submit a supplemental form.
Ms. Bergin returned the form without answering many of the questions. She instead attached a statement regarding her faith and medical privacy concerns. On Dec. 29, 2021, UCS denied her application for a religious exemption and instructed her to submit proof of vaccination by Jan. 10, 2022. When Ms. Bergin failed to do so, she was placed on administrative leave and subsequently terminated on April 7, 2022, for failure to comply with the vaccination requirement.
On Sept. 2, 2022, Ms. Bergin filed suit under Title VII, alleging that UCS failed to accommodate her religious beliefs. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (EDNY) granted partial summary judgment for Ms. Bergin, holding that there was no genuine dispute that she had made out a prima facie case of religious discrimination: (1) Ms. Bergin held a bona fide religious belief conflicting with a work requirement, (2) Ms. Bergin informed her employer of that belief and (3) Ms. Bergin was disciplined for failure to comply with the requirement. UCS appealed, arguing that EDNY failed to modify the prima facie test for failure to accommodate religion claims in light of Abercrombie.
Second Circuit’s Decision
Prior to Bergin, the Second Circuit assessed whether a plaintiff established a prima facie case of failure to accommodate a religious belief or practice under Title VII by asking whether the plaintiff (1) held a bona fide religious belief conflicting with a work requirement, (2) informed their employer of that belief and (3) was disciplined for failure to comply with the requirement. In Bergin, the Second Circuit was tasked with deciding whether the Supreme Court abrogated this test in Abercrombie. The Second Circuit held that it did.
In Abercrombie, the Supreme Court considered whether an employer violated Title VII when it refused to hire a prospective employee who the employer believed would a religious accommodation to its dress code. The Supreme Court held that the applicant did not have to actually request an accommodation; rather, the applicant need only show that their need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision. The Supreme Court explained that failure to accommodate religion claims fall within Title VII’s disparate treatment provision, which prohibits certain motives regardless of the actor’s knowledge. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that an employer with actual knowledge of the need for a religious accommodation does not violate Title VII by refusing to hire an applicant if avoiding that accommodation was not their motivation.
Given Abercrombie, the Second Circuit in Bergin concluded that the Supreme Court rejected one requirement of the Second Circuit’s old rule (that the plaintiff inform an employer of their need for an accommodation) and clarified that the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove that the employer was motivated in part by the desire to avoid offering a religious accommodation.
The Second Circuit held that, going forward, for a plaintiff to state a prima facie case for failure to accommodate a religious belief or practice under Title VII, they must demonstrate (1) that they actually required an accommodation of their religious practice, and (2) that the employer’s desire to avoid the actually required prospective accommodation was a motivating factor in (3) an adverse employment decision. Although an employer’s knowledge of the need for an accommodation may be evidence of motive, the absence of such knowledge is not dispositive.
Since the EDNY declined to apply the Abercrombie standard, the Second Circuit vacated its judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
Why Bergin Matters for Employers
The Bergin decision changes the legal standard for Title VII religious accommodation claims in the Second Circuit. By shifting the focus from employer knowledge to employer motivation, the decision will likely increase scrutiny of how religious accommodation requests are evaluated and documented. As a result, employers should ensure that religious accommodation decisions are supported by legitimate, well-documented business reasons.
Employer Takeaways
Employers should take several steps to comply with the Bergin decision:
- Review religious accommodation policies and practices to ensure they reflect the Abercrombie and Bergin standards.
- Train managers and human resources personnel on handling religious accommodation requests and documenting decisions.
- Document the legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons supporting religious accommodation decisions.
- Ensure religious accommodation requests are evaluated on an individualized basis.
- Recognize that evidence relating to employer motive may play a greater role in future religious accommodation litigation.
Please contact Adam P. Mastroleo, Anthony A. Levitskiy or any attorney in Bond’s labor and employment practice with whom you normally work, for questions, concerns and tailored consultation.
