On April 25, 2012, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued its Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The guidance follows prior statements by the EEOC concerning employers’ use of arrest and conviction information when making employment decisions, including whether to hire, retain, or promote individuals.  The EEOC has also published additional information concerning its new enforcement guidance in a Question and Answer-form summary.

Effect of the EEOC's Guidance

Employers can rest assured that the EEOC’s guidance does not make it a per se violation of Title VII to consider criminal history information.  It does, however, send a clear signal that the agency intends to scrutinize employment decisions that are based on an individual’s criminal past.  The EEOC stresses that criminal history information may be relevant to both “disparate treatment” claims (where people with the same criminal history are treated differently because of a legally protected characteristic) and “disparate impact” claims (where an employer’s facially neutral policy has a disproportionately adverse impact on a specific protected group).

In the disparate impact context, an employer can avoid liability by showing that the policy at issue is job related for the position and consistent with business necessity.  Under the new EEOC guidance, however, an employer will not typically satisfy this showing by merely tying its policy of considering prior criminal backgrounds to its general concern for property or safety.  Rather, employers are now expected to conduct a multi-factor analysis to confirm that the underlying policy is appropriately applied to a specific individual.

"Targeted Screens" and "Individualized Assessments"

In its guidance, the EEOC makes clear its position that a policy excluding everyone with a criminal background from employment will violate Title VII because it is not job related and consistent with business necessity.  The EEOC states that, at the very least, a policy must be rooted in a genuine nexus between a position and a particular crime.  To be valid, such a “targeted screen” must take into account the nature of the crime, the time elapsed, and the nature of the job in question.  The EEOC also emphasizes, however, that a targeted screen alone may be inadequate to avoid a disparate impact claim in many situations.  It therefore suggests that employers also conduct what it terms an “individualized assessment.”

To complete an individualized assessment in accordance with the new EEOC guidance, an employer must:  (1) notify the individual that he or she has been targeted for exclusion because of past criminal conduct; (2) give the individual an opportunity to explain why he or she should not be excluded; and (3) consider any information supplied by the individual to assess whether the practice or policy, as applied, is job related and consistent with business necessity.  The EEOC lists several examples of potentially relevant information that should be considered during the individualized assessment, including:  possible inaccuracies in the criminal history report; the applicant/employee’s age at the time of the offense; the number of offenses committed; whether similar work has been performed without incident; the applicant/employee’s employment history; rehabilitation efforts; and employment or character references.

Looking Ahead

Although the EEOC’s new guidance does not go so far as to prohibit employers from considering an individual’s criminal history when making employment decisions, it should serve as a reminder that this screening method is rife with potential legal pitfalls.  The EEOC’s emphasis on the national conviction rates for certain minority groups suggests that it is predisposed to litigating claims under a disparate impact theory.  The EEOC will consider whether the employer followed the several steps described in the new guidance to assess whether a screening policy is truly job related for a particular position and consistent with business necessity.

In addition, it is important for employers to remember that several states and municipalities have passed laws to prohibit discrimination on the basis of an individual’s criminal history.  For instance, the New York Human Rights Law and Corrections Law make it unlawful to base employment decisions on prior arrests or criminal convictions.  An exception exists that allows an employer to deny employment when the underlying conviction directly relates to the job or when employment would pose an unreasonable risk to property or the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public.  Before relying on this exception, however, employers must consider a variety of factors, including:

• the public policy of New York State to encourage employment of persons with criminal records;
• the specific duties and responsibilities of the position;
• the bearing the underlying offense will have on the person's fitness or ability to perform those duties and responsibilities;
• the time elapsed;
• the age of the person when the offense was committed;
• the seriousness of the offense;
• any information concerning the person's rehabilitation and good conduct; and
• the legitimate interest of the employer in protecting property or safety or welfare of individuals or the public.

By conducting this analysis, New York employers will also very likely be able to satisfy the EEOC’s expectations as stated in its new guidance.  To better insure compliance, however, it is strongly recommended that employers contact labor and employment counsel when assessing internal policies relating to the use of criminal history information in connection with employment decisions.

On June 28, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued its landmark decision on the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Act”), and ruled that all of the challenged health care reform provisions in the Act are constitutional other than a portion of a Medicaid expansion provision.  Although future challenges to the implementation of some or all of the Act will occur through the electoral process, additional litigation, and the legislative process, those challenges are unlikely to result in any significant changes in the requirements of the Act before the end of this year at the earliest.  In the meantime, there are a number of new requirements in the Act that covered employers will need to comply with in the near future, including:

• finalizing the Summary of Benefits and Coverage that most employers will be required to provide on the first day of open enrollment this fall;
• taking the steps necessary to comply with the $2,500 annual limit that will apply to health flexible spending accounts beginning in 2013, including making sure that open enrollment materials that will be distributed to eligible employees prior to the beginning of the 2013 plan year accurately describe the new limit;
• implementing any procedures necessary to track and record health coverage costs in 2012 to prepare for the new Form W-2 reporting requirement for group health plan coverage costs that will apply to Forms W-2 that will be issued by certain employers in January of 2013; and
• coordinating with any applicable insurer or administrator to make sure that the research fees that will be imposed by the Act on specified issuers of health insurance policies and plan sponsors of self-insured health plans starting with the first plan or policy year ending on or after October 1, 2012 are timely paid in 2013.

In addition to these requirements, the Act will impose numerous other requirements on covered employers in the next few years that should be planned for in advance of the applicable deadlines. Some of the more important of those requirements are described below:

• preventive care requirements for women that certain health plans will have to implement starting with plan years that begin on or after August 1, 2012;
• medical loss ratio rebate requirements that will apply to certain insured health plans starting in August of 2012 (certain insurers that fail to spend a specified percentage of premiums received on covered medical claims and quality improvement-expenses will have to provide rebates to the applicable health plans starting in August of 2012, and employers that have such plans will have to decide how to handle such rebates);
• 2013 increases in Medicare payroll taxes and FICA taxes for certain highly compensated individuals;
• certain employers will be required to provide a notice to their employees in March of 2013 about the health insurance exchanges that will become operational in 2014 (in addition to this notice requirement, certain employers will want to do an analysis in 2013 about how the health insurance exchanges might impact the health coverage they provide);
• the employer mandate requirement (commonly referred to as the “pay or play” requirement) that will apply in 2014 to certain employers having at least 50 full-time equivalent employees, which will require those employers to decide whether they will provide minimum essential health coverage to their full-time equivalent employees in 2014 or pay a financial penalty;
• nondiscrimination requirements for certain insured group health plans that will apply after the applicable regulations are issued; and
• numerous other requirements that will apply to many group health plans in 2014 or later, including expanded dependent coverage rules for “grandfathered” health plans, new preexisting condition exclusion requirements, a restriction on eligibility waiting periods that exceed 90 days, a requirement to eliminate all annual dollar limits for covered group health plans, new incentive/penalty requirements for wellness incentives, new minimum essential coverage requirements, new clinical trial coverage requirements, new provisions regarding guaranteed availability and renewability of insured health coverages, changes to Medicare Part D coverage, new automatic enrollment requirements that will apply to certain employers after the applicable regulations are issued, and a new “Cadillac” plan excise tax that will apply in 2018 if the aggregate value of certain health coverages exceed a specified amount.

Considerable guidance is going to be issued by the applicable governmental agencies to help employers implement the requirements described above, and that guidance should be monitored carefully to help ensure timely compliance with those requirements.

On June 8, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit refused to enforce a decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") on the ground that the Board had "departed, without giving a reasoned justification, from its precedent . . . ."  Prior to the Board's 2010 decision and order in E.I. Du Pont de Nemours v. NLRB, Board law had, for almost a decade, allowed an employer to make certain unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment, both during the term of a collective bargaining agreement and after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, provided that the changes are consistent with an established past practice.  However, in its 2010 Du Pont decision, the Board held that Du Pont's unilateral changes to its health plan constituted unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act ("Act"), despite the undisputed existence of a past practice permitting such changes.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Board's change of direction on this subject.

In the Du Pont case, the Board acknowledged that Du Pont had annually and consistently revised the terms of its health plan -- which applied both to union and non-union employees -- each year during an annual enrollment period, under the terms of the plan.  These changes typically included revised coverage terms, changed options, and increased premiums.  The management rights clause in the collective bargaining agreement with the union also encapsulated the employer's right to make these changes.

When Du Pont continued this annual practice of revising its health plan in 2004 following expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge, and the Board found that Du Pont had violated Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act by making impermissible unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employment.  The Board distinguished the employer's past practice of similar annual revisions to the health plan, noting that those prior occasions had occurred during the term of the collective bargaining agreement, not after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement.  The Board also held that Du Pont could not rely on the expired management rights clause to justify the post-expiration unilateral changes.

In rejecting the Board's holding, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals observed that, under the Board's existing precedent, the undisputed existence of a past practice permitting similar changes served to immunize those changes from scrutiny under the Act, regardless of whether the changes were made during the term of a collective bargaining agreement or after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.  The Court also noted that this immunity did not turn on the existence of a management rights clause in an unexpired collective bargaining agreement.  The Court stated:

Under the Board's precedent, therefore, Du Pont's making annual changes to [its health plan] became a term and condition of employment the Company could lawfully continue during the annual enrollment period, irrespective of whether negotiations for successor contracts were then on-going.

The Court's refusal to enforce the Board's Du Pont decision signals some judicial impatience with the Board's deviation from existing precedent without providing a well-reasoned justification for the sudden change in policy.

On or about June 20, 2012, the U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, released a 16-page guide to the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) in an effort to inform employees about the FMLA and to make the law more accessible to them.  This publication, entitled “Need Time? The Employee’s Guide to The Family and Medical Leave Act” (“Guide”), provides a basic overview of the FMLA.  Through a combination of text, flow-charts, and examples, it answers common questions that employees may have about their rights under the FMLA.

So what does this new publication mean for employers?

Although the Guide is specifically geared toward employees, it may also be useful to employers for the reasons set forth below.

• The Guide is written in plain English. For this reason, the document serves as a useful reference to refresh employers’ understanding regarding the basic rights and protections afforded to employees under the FMLA, as well as the obligations that the statute places on employers themselves.  For example, the Guide contains a flowchart which employers may find useful when determining whether an employee is eligible for FMLA leave.
• The Guide also reminds employees of their own responsibilities under the FMLA.  For instance, it notifies employees of their obligation to provide an employer with appropriate notice of the need for leave.  In addition, the Guide reminds employees that they are responsible, at their own expense, for ensuring that their employer receives a timely, compete, and sufficient medical certification form.  The Guide also reminds employees that their request for FMLA leave may be denied if they fail to provide employers with requested medical certification(s).  Finally, as a practical matter, the Guide stresses the need for employees to communicate with their employers.

A word of caution . . .

Many employers who are well-versed in the FMLA may not be inclined to utilize or familiar themselves with the Guide.  However, it is important for all employers to understand that this Guide also advises employees, in specific detail, regarding an employer’s obligations to the employee under the FMLA.  For example, the Guide states that employers must notify employees of their eligibility and rights and responsibilities within 5 business days, and must also notify employees within 5 business days if a leave request has, in fact, been designated as FMLA leave.  In addition, the Guide informs employees of their right to continued health benefits while on leave, as well as their right to be returned to the same or nearly identical position upon their return from FMLA leave.  Most importantly, employers should be aware that the Guide contains an entire page of detailed information informing employees how to file a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor if they feel their FMLA rights have been violated.

Finally, employers are reminded that while the Guide can be a helpful and informative resource to employers and employees alike, it does not serve as a substitute for a well-drafted FMLA policy that is compliant with the law.

Yesterday, an amendment to New York’s wage deduction statute – New York Labor Law Section 193 – passed both the New York State Senate and Assembly.  The amendment is expected to be signed by Governor Cuomo.  This legislation, if enacted, would permit employers to make a wider range of payroll deductions than currently enumerated in Section 193.

As we previously reported, the New York State Department of Labor has over the last couple of years issued several opinion letters which significantly narrow its interpretation of Section 193.  To summarize, NYSDOL has taken the position that a wage deduction is not permissible unless it is very similar to those expressly recognized in the statute as lawful (e.g., payments for insurance premiums, pension, or health and welfare benefits).  This interpretation varies from the NYSDOL’s historical focus on whether the deduction is for the “benefit of the employee.”

The pending amendment to Section 193 would expand the enumerated list of permissible wage deductions to include, among other things, deductions for:  (1) discounted parking costs; (2) certain mass transit costs; (3) gym membership dues; (4) certain cafeteria, vending machine, and gift shop purchases; (5) pharmacy purchases made at the employer’s place of business; (6) tuition, room, and board payments for educational pursuits; and (7) day care costs.  Notably for employers, the legislation would also permit the recovery of wage overpayments and wage advances by payroll deduction under certain circumstances and subject to future NYSDOL rulemaking.

We will continue to monitor this development and will provide additional details on our blog if and when the amendment is signed into law.

Employers in New York are well aware that the state agency that has jurisdiction over employment discrimination and harassment claims under the New York Human Rights Law (“NYRHL”) is the New York State Division of Human Rights (“Division”). The Division also has jurisdiction under the NYHRL to investigate and adjudicate certain other types of discrimination claims outside the employment context, such as alleged housing discrimination. However, in a recent case handled by Bond, Schoeneck & King on behalf of the Ithaca City School District (“ICSD”), the Division’s overly broad interpretation of its jurisdiction was curtailed by New York’s highest court. On June 12, 2012, the New York Court of Appeals held that the Division does not have jurisdiction over discrimination and harassment complaints filed by public school students under the NYHRL.

The case began in 2006, when a parent of a middle school student filed a complaint with the Division, alleging that her daughter had been subjected to racial harassment by other middle school students. The complainant alleged that ICSD was liable for the harassment under Section 296(4) of the NYHRL, which provides:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an education corporation or association which holds itself out to the public to be non-sectarian and exempt from taxation pursuant to the provisions of article four of the real property tax law . . . to permit the harassment of any student or applicant, by reason of his race, color, religion, disability, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, age or marital status . . . .

ICSD commenced a proceeding in Supreme Court, Tompkins County, under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, seeking an order prohibiting the Division from exercising jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground that a public school district is not an “education corporation or association” under Section 296(4) of the NYHRL. The court denied ICSD’s petition, and held that the Division could conduct a hearing regarding the complaint.

A hearing was held before a Division Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The ALJ issued a recommended decision finding ICSD liable for the harassment of the student by other middle school students. The Commissioner of Human Rights adopted the ALJ’s recommended decision regarding liability, but reduced the amount of the ALJ’s recommended damages award to the student and her mother.

ICSD appealed the Commissioner’s decision on several grounds, including the same jurisdictional ground upon which the initial Article 78 proceeding had been based. This time, the Supreme Court, Tompkins County, granted ICSD’s appeal and annulled the determination of the Commissioner. The court held that ICSD was not an “education corporation or association” under the NYHRL and that the Division therefore lacked jurisdiction over the complaint.

The Division appealed the decision to the Third Department Appellate Division, which reversed and held that the term “education corporation or association” should be interpreted broadly to include public school districts such as ICSD.

ICSD appealed the Third Department’s decision to the New York Court of Appeals. In a 4-3 decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the Third Department and held that a public school district is not an “education corporation or association” under the NYHRL and that the Division does not have jurisdiction over complaints filed by public school students for alleged discrimination or harassment. The Court of Appeals thoroughly analyzed the legislative history of the term “education corporation or association,” and determined that the legislature never intended that term to include public school districts.

The Court of Appeals rejected the Division’s argument that the term “education corporation or association” should be liberally construed, stating that “it is evident from the legislative history that the term ‘education corporation or association,’ the origins of which can be traced to the Tax Law, refers to only private, non-sectarian entities that are exempt from taxation under [article four of the real property tax law].” The Court of Appeals also observed that a public school district would never need to “hold itself out to the public to be non-sectarian and exempt from taxation” as stated in Section 296(4) of the NYHRL because all public school districts are non-sectarian and all public school districts are exempt from taxation by virtue of the fact that they are public entities.

Accordingly, although the Division can still exercise jurisdiction over employment discrimination and harassment claims filed against public school districts under the NYHRL, it can no longer exercise jurisdiction over discrimination and harassment claims filed by public school students.

On June 18, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals finding that pharmaceutical sales representatives at GlaxoSmithKline fall within the outside sales exemption from the overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  As reported in a previous blog post, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had reached the opposite conclusion in July of 2010, finding that pharmaceutical sales representatives employed by Novartis were not FLSA-exempt and that a class of more than 7,000 current and former employees in that position were entitled to pursue their overtime claims.  The Supreme Court's 5-4 decision resolves the split in the Circuit Courts on the scope of the FLSA's outside sales exemption and addresses the amount of deference owed to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the U.S. Department of Labor's regulations promulgated under the FLSA.

In amicus briefs filed with both the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Secretary of Labor initially took the position that a "sale" as described in the regulations required a "consummated transaction directly involving the employee for whom the exemption is sought."  Because pharmaceutical sales representatives promote drugs to physicians in exchange for nonbinding commitments to prescribe the drugs in appropriate cases, the Secretary argued that they did not "make sales" and, accordingly, could not qualify for the outside sales exemption.  After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, the Secretary argued instead that an employee does not make a sale unless he "actually transfers title to the property at issue."

Although an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations is normally entitled to deference, the majority found "strong reasons" for not deferring to the Secretary's interpretation in this instance.  Specifically, the majority found that the Secretary's current interpretation would impose potentially massive liability on employers without fair warning, especially given the U.S. Department of Labor's apparent acquiescence in the longstanding pharmaceutical industry practice of treating sales representatives as exempt.  In addition, the majority found that the Secretary's interpretation was not persuasive in its own right for a number of reasons, including that it was first announced in a series of amicus briefs with no opportunity for public comment, that the Secretary's initial interpretation argued before the Second and Ninth Circuits had proven to be untenable, and that it was "flatly inconsistent" with the FLSA's definition of "sale."

The majority held that the FLSA's statutory language regarding the outside sales exemption called for a functional inquiry, taking into consideration an employee's responsibilities in the context of the particular industry in which he or she works.  In light of the unique regulatory environment within which pharmaceutical companies operate, including the prohibition against dispensing certain drugs without a physician's prescription, the majority found that the sales representatives' promotional efforts to obtain non-binding commitments from physicians was "tantamount . . . to a paradigmatic sale of a commodity" within the pharmaceutical industry.  Furthermore, the majority found that its holding comported with the apparent purpose of the FLSA's exemption, because pharmaceutical sales representatives who typically earn over $70,000 per year are hardly the type of employees the FLSA was intended to protect.

On May 30, the NLRB's Acting General Counsel ("GC") issued a third report on social media cases.  We have addressed the NLRB's treatment of social media cases in several prior blog posts, including a summary of the GC's second report on social media cases.  The focus of this third report is social media policies, and for the first time, the GC has provided the full text of a social media policy that was determined to be lawful under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").  In addition, the report addresses six other cases in which the GC concluded that at least some of the provisions of employers' social media policies were overly broad and unlawful under the NLRA.  The following summary touches on just a few of the highlights contained in the GC's 24-page report.

A number of the provisions of social media policies that were found to be unlawful were restrictions on communicating confidential information.  Where a social media policy simply prohibits the disclosure of confidential information, the GC has determined that such a prohibition is overly broad because it could reasonably be interpreted to prohibit employees from discussing and disclosing information regarding their own and their co-workers' conditions of employment.  For example, the GC indicated in the report that the following provisions were found to be unlawful:

• "Don't release confidential guest, team member or company information. . . ."
• "Make sure someone needs to know.  You should never share confidential information with another team member unless they have the need to know the information to do their job.  If you need to share confidential information with someone outside the company, confirm there is proper authorization to do so.  If you are unsure, talk to your supervisor."
• "Watch what you say.  Don't have conversations regarding confidential information in the Breakroom or in any other open area.  Never discuss confidential information at home or in public areas."
• "Employees are prohibited from posting information regarding [Employer] on any social networking sites . . . that could be deemed material non-public information or any information that is considered confidential or proprietary.  Such information includes, but is not limited to, company performance, contracts, customer wins or losses, customer plans, maintenance, shutdowns, work stoppages, cost increases, customer news or business related travel plans or schedules."

The GC also found unlawful a provision of a social medial policy prohibiting "offensive, demeaning, abusive or inappropriate remarks" in social media communications.  According to the GC, this provision "proscribes a broad spectrum of communications that would include protected criticisms of the Employer's labor policies or treatment of employees."  Similarly, the GC found that provisions of an employer's social media policy that cautioned employees not to "pick fights" and to avoid "topics  that may be considered objectionable or inflammatory" when communicating on social media sites were unlawful.  The GC reasoned that discussions about working conditions or unionism have the potential to become heated or controversial, and that "without further clarification of what is 'objectionable or inflammatory,' employees would reasonably construe this rule to prohibit robust but protected discussions about working conditions or unionism."

The GC also addressed provisions regarding the "friending" of other employees on social media sites.  In general, the GC has found such provisions to be unlawful because they may be interpreted to restrict concerted activity.  For example, the GC concluded that the following provision was overly broad because it could potentially discourage employees from engaging in discussions and communications with their co-workers:

• "Think carefully about 'friending' co-workers . . . on external social media sites.  Communications with co-workers on such sites that would be inappropriate in the workplace are also inappropriate online, and what you say in your personal social media channels could become a concern in the workplace."

Provisions restricting the use of company logos or trademarks in an employee's social media posts were also generally found by the GC to be unlawful.  According to the GC, such provisions are overly broad because an employee could reasonably interpret them to prohibit the use of photos or videos of employees engaging in union activities such as holding picket signs with the employer's logo or trademark.

In the report, the GC also addressed again an employer's use of a "savings clause" in a social media policy (which essentially provides that the policy should not be interpreted or applied in a way that would interfere with an employee's rights under the NLRA).  As in previous reports, the GC reiterated that such clauses do not cure other provisions of the policy that are found to be unlawful.

In general, the GC advises employers to include limiting language and definitions in social media policies in order to give context to provisions that might otherwise be overly broad.  For example, instead of simply prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information, an employer should define what is deemed to be confidential information to ensure that an employee could not reasonably interpret the prohibition to apply to information about the employee's terms and conditions or employment.  The GC also suggests that an employer's social media policy should contain specific examples of activities that would be prohibited by the policy.

As a result of this report and the GC's prior reports on social media cases, it is now extremely difficult for employers to create a lawful and meaningful social media policy that adequately protects its own interests with minimal risk that the policy will be found to violate employee rights under the NLRA.  Employers who wish to create a new social media policy or wish to revise their existing policy would be well-advised to consult with their legal counsel.

Federal contractors may want to start preparing for proposed changes to the regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP"), in connection with federal contractors' affirmative action obligations.  OFCCP expects to have new final regulations in place during 2012, which will increase federal contractors' obligations regarding veterans and disabled individuals, as well as modify the documentation required during compliance evaluations.

Proactive steps that covered employers should consider taking include:

1. Review outreach and recruitment efforts, particularly with agencies representing disabled individuals and veterans.  Documentation should be kept of all outreach efforts, as well as any responses.
2. Invite applicants to identify themselves as covered veterans.
3. Check whether all non-executive job openings are being posted with the appropriate state employment delivery service and maintain documentation of postings.
4. Review handbooks and employment policies regarding leaves of absence and reasonable accommodations.
5. Analyze current data collection systems to determine whether there are any issues with collecting the additional information in the OFCCP's proposed Scheduling Letter and Itemized Listing:  (a) employment activity will be required to be submitted by job group and job title; and (b) individual compensation data will need to be submitted for all employees, including such information as gender, race/ethnicity, job title, EEO-1 category, job group, date of hire, base salary, wage rate, hours worked, and other compensation, such as bonuses, incentives, commissions, merit increases, locality pay, and overtime.
6. Analyze compensation data to determine if adjustments need to be made to eliminate any potential problematic pay disparities.

The proposed Itemized Listing requires covered employers to provide the OFCCP with individualized compensation data for all employees, which will enable the OFCCP to run a variety of analyses.  Covered employers should keep in mind that the OFCCP may not have appropriate measures to safeguard this sensitive data from Freedom of Information Act requests.  Before submitting any compensation data, covered employers should take steps to protect such information.

On May 14, 2012, a federal district court judge invalidated new regulations intended to streamline union representation elections, finding that the National Labor Relations Board lacked a proper three-member quorum when it voted on the controversial final rule in December of 2011.  The final rule, which has commonly been referred to as the "ambush" or ""quickie" election rule, went into effect on April 30, 2012.  The same federal district court judge had previously denied a request for a stay of the final rule, stating that he intended to issue a decision on the merits of the case by May 15.

Judge James Boasberg of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that the required three members necessary to establish a quorum were not present when the rule was adopted on December 16, 2011 because Member Hayes failed to participate in the final vote.  Hayes had previously voted against initiating the rulemaking process and against proceeding with the final rule.  Because of this prior opposition, the two other members issued the final rule without Member Hayes' participation.

Judge Boasberg rejected the Board's argument that Member Hayes had "effectively indicated his opposition" and that his participation in the final vote was not necessary.  In rejecting this argument, Judge Boasberg cited to an unlikely source:

According to Woody Allen, eighty percent of life is just showing up.  When it comes to a quorum requirement, though, showing up is even more important than that.  Indeed, it is the only thing that matters -- even when the quorum is constituted electronically.  In this case, because no quorum ever existed for the pivotal vote in question, the Court must hold the challenged rule is invalid.

 Judge Boasberg further reasoned that Member Hayes could not be counted toward a quorum particularly because no one on the Board reached out to him to ask for a response, as is the agency's usual practice where a member has failed to vote.  Judge Boasberg stated that if Hayes had affirmatively expressed his intent to abstain or acknowledged receiving notification that the final rule had been circulated, he may have been counted in the quorum; however, because none of those things happened, Judge Boasberg found that Member Hayes failed to "show up -- in any literal or even metaphoric sense."  Because the Board failed to meet the quorum requirement, Judge Boasberg refused to address the plaintiffs' challenge to the final rule on various procedural and substantive grounds.

It remains to be seen whether the newly constituted Board -- complete with three controversial and challenged recess appointees -- will be assembled to take final action on the "quickie" election rule.  In his decision, Judge Boasberg noted that nothing appears to prevent a properly constituted quorum of the Board from voting to adopt the rule if the Board desires to do so.  In addition, an appeal of Judge Boasberg's decision is likely.  If a new vote on the rule is held, it is likely that the rule will once again be challenged.

The Board has announced that, at least for now, all union representation elections based on petitions filed on or after April 30, 2012 will proceed under the old rules.

In an extremely important decision for employers, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that an employer can only be cited by OSHA for up to six months following the occurrence of an error or omission in its injury and illness record-keeping logs.  In so holding, the Court restored the plain text of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the "Act"), which provides that "no citation may be issued . . . after the expiration of six months following the occurrence of any violation."  OSHA regulations require employers to maintain their injury and illness logs for five years from the end of the calendar year that those records cover.  Relying on that regulation, OSHA had a longstanding practice of issuing citations up to five years following an alleged record-keeping violation.  For the first time, an appeals court held that this practice is contrary to the explicit statute of limitations contained in the Act.

The Court's decision was unanimous, and none of the judges thought very highly of OSHA's arguments to extend the statute of limitations to five years for record-keeping violations.  The Court stated that OSHA was "heroically attempt[ing]" to "tie this straightforward issue into a Gordian knot," and was "kick[ing] up" a "cloud of dust . . . in an effort to lead us to [the Secretary of Labor's] interpretation."

While employers may still be cited beyond the six-month statute of limitations if violations are continuing or ongoing, this decision will have a significant impact on OSHA's enforcement of employers' record-keeping obligations.  OSHA has 90 days from the date of the decision to file a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court if it wishes to appeal the Court's decision.

As we noted in our June 17, 2010 blog post, social networking sites have become a popular tool for employers seeking information about job applicants during the hiring process.  However, employers' efforts to obtain information that enables them to access their employees' and applicants' private social media web sites have recently been subject to increased scrutiny by New York State and Federal legislators.

On April 13, 2012, New York State Senator Liz Krueger sponsored and introduced a bill that would prohibit employers, as well as their agents or representatives, from requiring employees or job applicants to disclose log-in names, passwords, or other means for accessing a personal account or service through an electronic communications device.  This includes information such as private social media account log-in names and personal e-mail account passwords.  This proposed legislation would also prohibit employers from discharging, disciplining, or otherwise penalizing an employee, or failing to hire an applicant, based on the refusal to provide information that would enable the employer to access personal accounts or services through an electronic communications device.  The New York Attorney General would have the authority under the proposed legislation to enjoin employers from committing such unlawful practices, and employers could be subject to a $300.00 fine for a first offense and a $500.00 fine for each subsequent offense.

This proposed legislation comes just weeks after U.S. Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) sent open letters to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice urging the agencies to investigate employers' practice of requiring applicants to provide Facebook and e-mail passwords as a condition for job interviews.

Efforts to enact legislation similar to the New York bill are currently underway in several states.  In fact, Maryland recently became the first state to enact legislation that prohibits employers from requiring that employees or applicants disclose user names, passwords, or other means for accessing a personal account or service through an electronic communications device.

As we indicated in our June 17, 2010 blog post, employers should be careful even when viewing publicly available information regarding applicants on social media web sites.  Because Facebook and other similar web sites potentially contain a plethora of information about job applicants that employers cannot consider during the hiring process (e.g., race, national origin, religion, marital status, sexual orientation, etc.), employers should exercise caution in using social media web sites to screen applicants.  Employers who choose to use social media in the hiring process should promulgate a clear policy and procedure for utilizing this tool, and should closely follow the developments in this area of the law.